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IIAbstract
This thesis analyses West Germany's economic growth from 1971 to 1990 and the
economic growth of the reunited Germany from 1992 to 2011 using the growth
models of Solow (1956) - Swan (1956), Kaldor (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees
1962; Kaldor 1966) and Romer (1986).
Applying the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) model, it was found that TFP growth
was the main driver of Germany's growth during both time periods. However,
Germany's economic growth after the reunication was signicantly weaker than
it had been before the reunication, mainly because TFP growth and capital ac-
cumulation was lower. The ndings of this thesis also show that 
uctuations in
TFP can be explained by the propositions put forward by the Real Business Cycle
theory. The German's experience based on the both periods of study is consistent
with the analysis found in Plosser (1989) in that there is a positive relationship
between GDP growth and TFP growth.
The application of the technical progress function of Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962)
suggested that Germany experienced more technical progress during the second
IIItime period than during the rst one. For the reunited Germany capital accu-
mulation contributed 0.68 to every one percent increase in RGDP, whereas for
West Germany it contributed 0.44 to every one percent increase in RGDP. The
regression (Kaldor's technical progress function) results suggested that lower TFP
growth for the second time period was due to lower capital investments. In addi-
tion, it was found that West Germany's production process from 1971 to 1990 was
slightly more capital intensive than the production process of Germany from 1992
to 2011.
The thesis also tested Kaldor's (1966) three growth laws on the growth experi-
ence of the reunited Germany. It was found that only the rst proposition was
conrmed, suggesting that the manufacturing sector was the driver of Germany's
economic growth. No evidence was found for Kaldor's (1966) second and third
propositions.
The application of Romer's (1986) growth model was unsuccessful. Neither the
use of the number of patents granted, R&D expenditure or R&D personnel as
a proxy for knowledge did show a statistically signicant relationship with TFP
growth or with the evolution of the net capital stock. Therefore, it is concluded
that in Germany knowledge accumulation does not lead to technological progress
IVor capital accumulation. If the number of patents granted, R&D expenditure or
R&D personnel did not played a positive impact on TFP growth, then what is a
signicant sector? One such sector could be "learning-by-doing" as proposed by
Arrow (1962).
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XVIIIChapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Aim of the thesis
This thesis aims to analyse West Germany's economic growth from 1971 to 1990
and Germany's economic growth from 1992 to 2011 using the Solow (1956) - Swan
(1956), Kaldor (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962; Kaldor 1966) and Romer
(1986) growth models.
Germany is an interesting country to analyse in terms of economic growth. After
the second world war it was divided into two countries: The capitalist Federal Re-
public of Germany (West Germany) and the socialist German Democratic Republic
(East Germany). While East Germany experienced little growth, West Germany,
on the other hand, was a highly growing, wealthy and prosperous country. After
both German countries reunited in 1990 the economic growth performance was
poor. This was of little surprise. The long division and the dierent political
and economic systems resulted in both countries being very dierent in numerous
1aspects, including their economic development (Fulbrook 2004). The empirical
analysis conducted in this thesis will shed further light into these two very dier-
ent growth experiences.
The Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) growth model is an excellent framework to anal-
yse Germany's economic growth under the assumption of constant returns to scale.
The model allows to decompose and trace Germany's economic growth into growth
coming from technological progress or factor accumulation (labour and capital
stock). This is important because only economic growth that is propelled by tech-
nological progress is the type of growth that will be sustainable in the long-run
(Solow 1956; Swan 1956; Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962). In contrast,
economic growth being derived from factor accumulation (increasing labour and
capital inputs) is only a temporary phenomenon, because once the capital to labour
ratio is in unity or steady state, diminishing returns will set in (Solow 1956; Swan
1956).
Applying the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) growth framework to Germany, it is
possible to derive which factors contributed positively or negatively to Germany's
economic growth. The application of the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) model will
also demonstrate how West Germany's economic growth from 1971 to 1990 was
2dierent to the one of Germany from 1992 to 2011. Special attention will be paid
to the size of the contribution of technological progress in order to assess whether
Germany's economic growth is sustainable.
Technological change as captured by the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) model has
recently been applied by the Real Business Cycle (RBC) theory to explain 
uctu-
ations over the business cycle (Long and Plosser 1983; Prescott 1986). This thesis
will run a simple regression in order to test whether the RBC theory holds for the
German growth experience.
While technological progress is the key to long-run economic growth, according
to the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) growth model, the model itself does not oer
an explanation of the causes of technological progress. This is not satisfactory for
policy makers, who need to nd out what is driving technological progress. Be-
cause of its inability to explain technological progress, the model of Solow (1956)
and Swan (1956) is sometimes called an exogenous economic growth model. The
growth model of Kaldor (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962; Kaldor 1966)
on the other hand is an endogenous growth model which embodies technological
progress into capital accumulation. Specically, it assumes that there is a constant
stream of new ideas and the integration of these new ideas is determined through
3the rate of investment. This concept is described by Kaldor's technical progress
function (Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962).
Kaldor (1966) also provided three growth propositions. These propositions argue
that the manufacturing industry plays a crucial role for economic growth. The
reasoning is that the manufacturing sector with its capital intensive production
techniques oers a wide range of possibilities for technological progress to occur,
leading the manufacturing sector to be subject to increasing returns to scale. Ac-
cording to Kaldor (1966), the increasing returns to scale of the manufacturing
sector drive the economic growth of the whole economy.
The empirical analysis of this thesis will include estimations of the technical
progress function proposed by Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) for both West Germany
and for the reunited Germany. In addition, Kaldor's (1966) growth propositions
will be tested on the reunited Germany. This is useful because the application of
Kaldor's (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962; Kaldor 1966) model provides
additional insights on Germany's growth experience.
The growth model of Romer (1986) is another endogenous growth model. It is
also the rst type of the new growth theories. In contrast to previous growth
4theories Romer (1986) suggests that there are increasing returns to scale in the
whole economy. Romer (1986) also equipped his model with microeconomic foun-
dations in order to overcome weaknesses associated with both the Solow (1956)
- Swan (1956) and the Kaldor (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962; Kaldor
1966) growth model.
To endogenize technological progress Romer (1986) argued that the accumulation
of knowledge is the key to economic growth, because the discovery of new knowl-
edge enables rms to produce a better and more productive capital stock. Hence,
like the model of Kaldor (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962; Kaldor 1966),
the Romer (1986) model is another attempt to embody technological progress into
capital. A further crucial aspect of the Romer (1986) model is the assumption
that knowledge is an externality. New knowledge cannot be kept secret to a full
extent and unavoidably spills over to other companies. This implies that rms
conduct too little research because they speculate to benet from the research
conducted by other rms. Therefore, the growth model of Romer (1986) predicts
a Pareto inecient outcome because the economy does not grow as strongly as it
could since rms fail to invest the Pareto optimal level of resources into knowledge
accumulation. In light of the analysis of Romer (1986) this thesis will attempt
to determine the relationship of knowledge accumulation to technological progress
5and the capital stock.
In summary, the objective of this thesis is to look at the following questions:
According to Solow (1956) and Swan (1956), where did West Germany's economic
growth from 1971 to 1990 come from? Was this growth sustainable? And what
about the growth experience of the reunited Germany from 1992 to 2011? What
are the dierences to West Germany's growth experience? And do the estimated
rates of technological change explain the West Germany's and Germany's business
cycles, as proposed by the Real Business Cycle theory?
According to Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962), how strong was technical progress in
West Germany and in the reunited Germany? How capital intensive was the
production in both periods? Do the three growth propositions of Kaldor (1966)
t the growth experience of Germany from 1992 to 2011?
And lastly, does Romer's (1986) analysis explain Germany's technological progress
after the reunication?
1.2 Structure
To answer these questions, this thesis is structured in the following order: Chap-
ter 2 provides the theoretical foundations by oering a detailed explanation of
the three relevant growth models. Chapter 3 presents information on Germany's
6post-war political history, the economic development of West Germany from 1945
to 1970 and a trend analysis for the time period of 1971 to 1990 and one for the
time period of 1992 to 2011. In addition, Chapter 3 includes a brief summary
of the economic implementation of the reunication. The empirical analysis and
a discussion of the results can be found in Chapter 4. Chapter 4 also provides
information on the relevant data sources and on any data renements that were
necessary. Lastly, Chapter 5 gives a summary of the ndings and concluding re-
marks. Appendix A provides information on the curvature of production functions
and Appendix B shows how the net capital stock was derived.
7Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework of Study
2.1 Introduction
In order to achieve long-run sustainable economic growth, output growth of a
country must be driven by technological progress. Technological progress allows
a country to produce more output with the same amount of input (Solow 1956;
Swan 1956; Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962). In contrast, economic growth
which is entirely based on factor accumulation will only lead to short-run growth,
because such growth is subject to diminishing returns (Solow 1956; Swan 1956).
In order to understand the importance of technological progress as the driver of
long-run economic growth it is appropriate to start with the building blocks of the
Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) growth framework.
82.2 The Solow-Swan growth model
The Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) growth model, which is also called the neoclas-
sical model of economic growth, was developed independently by Robert Solow
and Trevor Swan in 1956. Solow's (1956) motivation was to challenge the Har-
rod (1939) - Domar (1946) growth model, which is based on the assumption that
production takes place under conditions of xed proportions, without allowing the
possibility to substitute labour for capital in production. This assumption is a
crucial one because it leads to the model's conclusion that a healthy economy has
to have a balance between the natural rate of growth, which depends on the in-
crease in the labour force, and the warranted rate of growth, which depends on
the saving and investment behaviour of households and rms. This balance is
very sensitive and a slight change in the key parameters (the savings ratio, the
capital-output ratio and the rate of increase of the labour force) can lead to a dis-
proportion causing unemployment or in
ation. Solow (1956) stressed that a model
which derives its main conclusion from such a questionable assumption can only
be rejected. However, Solow (1956) did support the other assumptions which are
made by the Harrod (1939) - Domar (1946) model. Thus Solow (1956) proposed a
model, which analyses long-run economic growth using all the assumptions of the
Harrod (1939) - Domar (1946) model, except the one of xed proportions.
9The aim of Swan (1956), on the other hand, was to contribute to our understanding
of the relationship between capital accumulation and the growth of the produc-
tive labour force. As Swan (1956) pointed out, this had been subject to extensive
research by various famous economists (Smith, Mill, Lewis and Ricardo). Yet,
neoclassical economists have not been able to contribute an explanation of this
relationship, even though productivity and saving are central components of the
neoclassical school of thought. Swan (1956) hoped to provide some insights with
his paper.
Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) derived the same model in their articles. While they
did follow dierent approaches to build them, they made the same assumptions
and came to the same implications. The following sections describe the model's
assumptions and its dynamics.
2.2.1 Assumptions
The assumptions of the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) model can be classied in
assumptions about outputs and inputs and in assumption about the production
function.
102.2.1.1 Assumption concerning outputs and inputs
The model focuses on four variables: Output (Y ), capital (K), labour (L) and
technology (A). Output refers to net output, meaning that depreciation of capital
is deducted. Both Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) assumed that output is either
consumed, or saved and invested. The amount which is saved and invested is
added to the capital stock, which is assumed to be fully employed (Solow 1956;
Swan 1956). Solow (1956) expressed the annual increase of the net capital stock
as
_ K = sYt (2.1)
where the dot on _ K indicates that K is dierentiated with respect to time and s
is the marginal propensity to save. Swan (1956) expressed the annual increase of
the capital stock as a relative rate:
k = s
Y
K
(2.2)
where k is the annual growth rate of capital in per cent (Swan 1956).
The model follows the neoclassical approach to assume full employment and the
labour force is assumed to increase at a constant rate n (Solow 1956; Swan 1956).
11Solow (1956) expressed labour growth as:
Lt = L0e
nt (2.3)
Solow (1956) pointed out that Equation 2.3 can also be referred to as a perfectly
inelastic labour supply curve. If the labour supply changes, the wage rate adjusts
accordingly, ensuring that all labour is employed (Solow 1956).
Like the labour growth rate, the rate of technological change is assumed to be
constant and it is expressed by g (Solow 1956; Swan 1956). Solow (1956) described
the stance of technology using the following equation:
At = e
gt (2.4)
2.2.1.2 Assumptions concerning the production function
The model species that a combination of capital, labour and technology creates
output (Solow 1956; Swan 1956). Both Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) used the
Cobb-Douglas production function to formalise this. Yet, Solow (1956) rst intro-
duced his model using an unspecied production function, as this allowed him to
demonstrate the model's general characteristics rst. Solow (1956) expressed the
12production function as
Y = f(K;L); (2.5)
In contrast, Swan (1956) used the Cobb-Douglas production function right from
the start and wrote:
Y = K
L
 (2.6)
where  is the share of capital and  is the share of labour. Technological change
is ignored in both of these formulations, but it will be introduced later (Solow
1956; Swan 1956).
A crucial assumption of the model is that production has constant returns to scale
in its two factors, capital and labour. Thus,  +  = 1. Constant returns to scale
means that when labour and capital inputs are increased by the factor , output
also increases by . This is illustrated with the following equation (Solow 1956;
Swan 1956):
f(Kt;Lt) = Yt (2.7)
One implication is that there are no scarce non-augmentable resources in the neo-
classical growth model. An example of such a resource is land, which once fully
developed, cannot be increased. Allowing for non-augmentable resources would
lead to decreasing returns to scale in capital and labour, which was one of the
13fundamental assumptions in Ricardo's model (Solow 1956).
Furthermore, it is assumed that the marginal productivity of both capital and
labour is positive, but it is diminishing (Solow 1956; Swan 1956). Therefore, the
rst derivative of output with respect to capital and labour is positive, whereas
the second derivative is negative:
dY
dK
> 0; and
d2Y
dK2 < 0 (2.8)
dY
dL
> 0; and
d2Y
dL2 < 0 (2.9)
Positive marginal productivity of capital and labour means that as capital or labour
increases, output increases. However, because of diminishing marginal productiv-
ities, it increases at a decreasing rate. Figure 2.1 illustrates this assumption using
the example of how output evolves when capital keeps increasing:
14Figure 2.1: The Solow-Swan production function
Figure 2.1 shows that while output keeps increasing with an increasing capital-
labour ratio, the increase in output becomes smaller. Thus, the production func-
tion follows a strictly concave type (see Appendix A).
2.2.2 Dynamics of the model
Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) followed dierent mathematical approaches to build
their models and both ways are outlined in the following. First, it looks at how
the model is being derived under the assumption of no technological change and
15then it shows how it is adjusted when technological change is introduced.
2.2.2.1 The basic model without technological change
Solow (1956) rst dened both K and L. The values of K and L can then be used
to determine the output Y (after specifying the production function).
In order to determine the accumulation of the capital stock, Solow (1956) substi-
tuted his savings function (Equation 2.1) and his labour function (Equation 2.3)
into his production function (Equation 2.5) to derive the following:
_ K = sf(K;L0e
nt): (2.10)
The solution to Equation 2.10 gives the only values of K which fully employ the
capital stock (Solow 1956).
Next, Solow (1956) derived the time path of labour which is consistent with the
one of capital. Solow (1956) dened r as the ratio of capital to labour, r = K
L.
Employing Equation 2.3, Solow (1956) expressed the capital stock in terms of
labour growth: K = rL = rL0ent. Dierentiating K with respect to time by using
both the product rule and the rule for dierentiating exponents Solow (1956)
16derived:
_ K = (
dr
dt
 L0e
nt) + (r  nL0e
nt) (2.11)
= _ rL0e
nt + rnL0e
nt (2.12)
Equations 2.10 and 2.12 both describe _ K. Equalising them Solow (1956) obtained:
sf(K;L0e
nt) = _ rL0e
nt + rnL0e
nt (2.13)
sf(K;L0e
nt) = (_ r + nr)L0e
nt (2.14)
Equation 2.14 is further simplied by dividing both variables in f by L = L0ent
and by multiplying f with the same factor (Solow 1956):
sL0e
ntf(
K
L0ent;1) = (_ r + nr)L0e
nt (2.15)
Next, Solow (1956) divided both sides of Equation 2.15 with the common factor
L0ent:
sf(
K
L0ent;1) = _ r + nr (2.16)
Finally, by substituting r for K
L0ent and by rearranging, Solow (1956) turns Equa-
17tion 2.16 into his nal equation:
_ r = sf(r;1)   nr (2.17)
The value _ r gives the rate of change of the capital-labour ratio. It depends on the
dierence of sf(r;1) and nr. The function f(r;1) is the total product curve with
varying amounts of capital employed while keeping the employed labour constant
at one unit. The second term, nr is the labour growth rate times the capital-labour
ratio. It describes by how much investment must rise to keep the capital-labour
ratio constant, given a specic growth of the labour force (Solow 1956). Figure 2.2
illustrates Solow's (1956) propositions:
18Figure 2.2: Solow's growth diagram
Source: Solow (1956) p. 70
The horizontal axis of Figure 2.2 shows the capital-labour ratio and the vertical
axis shows the output-labour ratio. The term nr is illustrated as a straight and
upward slopping line. Function sf(r;1) is described by a curve whose slope goes
towards zero as the capital-labour ratio increases. This decreasing slope is the re-
sult of the diminishing marginal productivity capital and leads to the intersection
of both lines at point r. At this point _ r equals zero.
Swan (1956) arranged the model by using his savings function (Equation 2.2), the
19growth rate of the labour force n, the capital share  and the labour share  to
derive the annual economic growth rate y (Swan 1956):
y = s
Y
K
+ n (2.18)
The interpretation of Equation 2.18 is quite straightforward. Economic growth is
the result from saving, which increases the capital stock and from the change rate
of the labour force. The share of capital and the share of labour determine to what
proportion these factors contribute to economic growth. Figure 2.3 shows Swan's
(1956) diagram:
20Figure 2.3: Swan's growth diagram
Source: Swan (1956), p. 336
Figure 2.3 illustrates the output-capital ratio is on the horizontal axis and the
growth rates are on the vertical axis. The diagram shows four lines: The capital
function s Y
K, the contribution line of capital s Y
K, the labour growth line n and
the economic growth line y. The capital function illustrates the growth of capital
given a specic output-capital ratio. The dependent contribution line of capital
indicates how much the capital growth is contributing to economic growth, given
the capital share. Labour growth is illustrated by a horizontal line, as labour is
assumed to grow at a constant rate. The dashed line represents the growth line
21of output. All lines except the capital line intersect at the point Y 
K, where the
economic growth is 1 per cent.
2.2.2.2 The introduction of technological change
Before looking at the implication of the intersection point, it is useful to point
out how the model is adjusted when constant technological change is introduced.
Like before, Solow's (1956) approach is outlined rst. As Solow (1956) explained,
technological change simply multiplies the production function by an increasing
scale factor. Equation 2.5 becomes:
Yt = Atf(Kt;Lt) (2.19)
where At denotes the stance of technology at time period t (Solow 1956). Thus,
Equation 2.19 suggests that positive technological change increases output. Fig-
ure 2.4 demonstrates that positive technological change shifts the production func-
tion upwards:
22Figure 2.4: The eects of positive technological change on the produc-
tion function
As shown by Figure 2.4 positive technological change enables the economy to
create more output with the same level of capital and labour input. How did
Solow (1956) include technological change formally into his model? Solow (1956)
dened At = egt and recalibrated Equation 2.10 to a Cobb-Douglas type, as shown
23in the following:
_ K = sAtK
L
 (2.20)
= se
gtK
(L0e
nt)
1  (2.21)
= sK
(L0)
1 e
(n(1 )+g)t (2.22)
Following a Cobb-Douglas production function, _ K can now be integrated into K,
transforming Equation 2.22 to become (Solow 1956):
Kt =

(K0)
  
s
n + g
(L0)
 +
s
n + g
(L0)
e
(n+g)t
 1

(2.23)
where  = 1    because of constant returns to scale. After having obtained Kt,
output Yt can simply be determined by using the Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion (Solow 1956).
In Swan's (1956) case, technological change can just be added to the output growth
Equation 2.18 (Swan 1956):
y = s
Y
K
+ n + g (2.24)
24Figure 2.5 demonstrates the consequences of positive technological change, using
Swan's (1956) diagram:
Figure 2.5: Swan's diagram for positive technological change
Source: Swan (1956), p. 336
As Figure 2.5 shows, technological change shifts y to y0 leading to a new equilibrium
at point Y 
K. The contribution of technological change to economic growth is the
dierence between y and y0, which can be read of the vertical axis. As savings are
higher at the new equilibrium, the growth of the capital stock is increased. The
increase of capital stock growth will increase economic growth further. Hence,
technological change has a direct impact on economic growth through the shift
25of the production function and it also has an indirect impact which comes from
the stronger growth of the capital stock which is caused by the stronger growth of
output (Solow 1956; Swan 1956).
2.2.2.3 The steady state
Both Solow's (1956) and Swan's (1956) graph (Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3) have
shown a point of intersection. This point is a stable equilibrium, the so called
steady state. At the steady state, labour, capital and output grow at the same
rate. Consequently, per capita growth of output is constant.
An economy always drives towards the steady state. Looking at Figure 2.2, if the
economy is at the left of the intersection point r, then r is smaller than r. In this
case nr is smaller than sf(r;1). Following the implications of Equation 2.17 this
means that _ r is positive and therefore r will increase towards r over the following
time periods. In contrast, when the economy is to the right of the intersection
point r then nr will be greater than sf(r;1) and according to Equation 2.17
_ r will be negative, leading to a decrease in r over the following time periods.
Thus, the economy will again move towards r. The same can be seen in Swans's
(1956) diagram (Figure 2.3). Anywhere to the left of the intersection point Y 
K,
output grows faster than capital. Therefore, the output-capital ratio is increasing,
meaning that it moves to the right. Anywhere to the right of the intersection point,
26capital growth is stronger than output growth, meaning that the output-capital
ratio moves to the left. Consequently, the intersection point is the only stable
equilibrium. At any other point there is a movement towards the intersection
point (Solow 1956; Swan 1956). After having explained the Solow (1956) - Swan
(1956) model, the next section provides a brief explanation of how it is applied by
the RBC theory.
2.2.3 Real Business Cycle Theory
The RBC theory uses the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) model to explain business
cycles. Business cycle theories attempt to explain the 
uctuations of a range of
important economic variables such as price, output, employment, consumption
and investment from trend over a certain period of time. These 
uctuations are
persistent over a certain time interval and the economic key variables tend to move
together over a business cycle (Long and Plosser 1983).
The Real Business Cycle theory argues that technological 
uctuations are the
drivers of business cycles (Prescott 1986). Following ndings by Nelson and Plosser
(1982) these technological 
uctuations are assumed to follow a random walk, which
means that they are absolutely unpredictable. Real Business Cycle theory views
technological progress as the main driver of business cycles because individuals are
27assumed to respond to technological 
uctuations as utility maximising economic
agents. When a positive technological shock sets in, productivity increases and
individuals exploit the higher productivity by working and consuming more. In
contrast, when a negative technological shock leads to a decrease in productivity,
individuals decide to consume and work less in order to enjoy leisure time. This
behaviour ensures that the individual's utility, which derives from consumption
and leisure time, is maximised and it explains why these economic variables move
together (Plosser 1989).
In an in
uential paper, Prescott (1986) proposed that the total factor productivity
(TFP) of the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) growth framework (which is denoted as
A as discussed previously) is an estimate for technological 
uctuations. Deriving
his own TFP estimates, Prescott (1986) demonstrated that there is a strong cor-
relation between output growth and TFP growth for the USA. This result was
also conrmed by an analysis conducted by Mankiw (1989). As this thesis will
estimate TFP growth values for Germany it will be tested whether Germany's
growth experience is consistent with the RBC analysis.
282.3 The Kaldor growth model
The next model to outline is the growth model of Kaldor (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor
and Mirrlees 1962; Kaldor 1966). This model was derived in a couple of papers,
but the two main articles were A Model of Economic Growth, which was published
in 1957 and A New Model of Economic Growth. Later, Kaldor (1966) extended
his growth model by formulating three growth propositions.
Kaldor (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962) was dissatised with existent
growth theories back at that time. Empirical evidence indicated that the share of
wages and the share of prots in the national income was constant in developed
economies. In addition, observations had shown that while the value of capital
per worker and the value of output per worker were increasing, the capital per
output ratio was not changing. This implies that capital per worker and output
per worker were rising at the same rate. Kaldor (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees
1962) argued that if both the share of prots and the capital per output ratio are
constant, then the rate of prot must also be constant. And this hypothesis is
in fact conrmed by empirical evidence (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962).
Existing theories including the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) model were unable
to explain these characteristics. Kaldor (1957) and Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962)
29attempted to address this shortcoming by building an endogenous growth model,
which can explain the constant capital to output ratio.
2.3.1 Assumptions
Most of the model's assumptions are used to formulate equations, which char-
acterise one important aspect of the model. These equations are then used to
describe the dynamics of the model. In total Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) derived
ten independent equations which determine the following ten variables: Invest-
ments It, the amount of investment per operative on machine it, the number of
workers available to operate new equipment nt, productivity pt, wages wt, expected
wages w
t, share of prot t, period of obsolescence of equipment T, output y, and
the working population Nt.
Four parameters are required to solve these equations: the proportion of prots
which is being saved s, the period within investment costs must be recovered h,
the radioactive physical depreciation rate  and the population growth  (Kaldor
and Mirrlees 1962). The following section looks at a couple of general assumptions
of the model.
302.3.1.1 General assumptions
The Kaldor (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962) model assumes that a growing
economy is in a state of full employment in a Keynesian sense. This means that its
growth is not constrained by the demand side, but rather by the supply side. This
is explained with the assumption that a growing economy utilises its production
capabilities to the maximum level. Thus, an increase in monetary demand cannot
in
uence short term growth, because with all production capabilities already be-
ing in use, output cannot be increased any further. In such an environment full
employment is guaranteed because unless the growth path of capital and income
is disturbed, an outcome where output is short of full employment is not stable.
For example, if aggregate demand is higher than aggregate supply, rms will de-
cide to increase their output by employing more labour until full employment is
reached. Once the economy reaches the full employment state, the equilibrium
between aggregate supply and aggregate demand is enforced through the change
of prices in relation to costs. Therefore under-employment is not consistent with
steady economic growth (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962).
Another key assumption of the model is that technical progress occurs through the
introduction of new equipment, like for example new machines. An economy which
introduces new capital at a high rate experiences more technological progress than
31one with a low rate of capital accumulation. Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) captured
this characteristic with their technical progress function, which is based on the
rate of introduction of new equipment and the obsolescence of capital. Kaldor and
Mirrlees (1962) also included radioactive physical depreciation, which represents
the decrease of the existing stock of equipment through physical causes such as
accidents or res. The obsolescence and the radioactive physical depreciation both
suggest that the productivity of equipment is diminishing. The resulting technical
progress function is expressed as followed (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962):
_ pt
pt
= f(
_ it
it
) (2.25)
where pt is productivity and it is the amount of investment per operative on ma-
chines of vintage t, which is determined by the following equation:
it =
It
nt
(2.26)
where It stands for gross investment in xed capital and nt represents the number of
workers available to operate new equipment per period. Therefore, the technical
progress function (Equation 2.25) represents the growth rate of productivity as
a function of the growth rate of investment per operative on machines and the
absolute value of investment per operative on machines (Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962).
The technical progress function is illustrated by Figure 2.6:
32Figure 2.6: The technical progress function of Kaldor and Mirrlees
Source: Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962), p. 176
Figure 2.6 shows that even if there is no growth in investment, there are some
increases in productivity, because eciency can always be improved over time.
Furthermore, it is illustrated that additional investment growth increases produc-
tivity growth at a decreasing rate (Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962).
Next, it is assumed that entrepreneurs form their investment decisions in a process
of careful evaluation. An investment has to fulll two conditions in order to be
pursued: First, the investment must sustain the protability of the company above
a certain minimum. This minimum is dependent on the opportunity cost, as the
33prot maximising entrepreneur is not interested in investments that yield inferior
rates of return to what other investments could earn. Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962)
suggested that the sum of the equipment's expected prot during its anticipated
period of operation is obtained by the following equation:
it 
Z t+T
t
e
 (+)(T t)(pt   w

T)dT (2.27)
where T represents the anticipated period of the equipment's lifetime,  is the
entrepreneur's estimate of the opportunity cost, w
T is the expected rate of wages
which is an increasing function of T, and  represents the radioactive physical
depreciation of the equipment (Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962).
The second condition states that entrepreneurs only invest if the cost of the invest-
ment is recovered within a relatively short period of time. Investments which amor-
tise over a long period of time are avoided because they expose the entrepreneur
to additional risk deriving from the uncertainty of the future. Kaldor and Mirrlees
(1962) expressed the second investment conditions as followed:
it 
Z t+h
t
(pt   w

T)dT (2.28)
where h represents the time span during which the new equipment must have gen-
34erated its initial cost. The model assumes that the rst condition (Equation 2.27) is
always fullled, whenever the second condition (Equation 2.28) is satised (Kaldor
and Mirrlees 1962).
Furthermore, Kaldor (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962) followed the tradi-
tion Keynesian approach of assuming passive savings. Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962)
postulated a mechanism in which savings, which are used for investing, are auto-
matically determined and the investor is not assumed to take an active role in the
determination of savings. This mechanism species that savings are coming from
the prots which are generated by the entrepreneur's business operations. Savings
of wage earners are ignored in this model. The following equation determines the
share of prots (Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962):
t =
It
sYt
=
r
s
it
yt
(2.29)
where s represents the constant proportion of prots which is being saved, yt is
the per capita income growth, and r is dened by rt = nt
Nt, where Nt represents the
size of the labour force and nt denotes the number of labour available to operate
new machinery (Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962).
The model also assumes that there is a minimum boundary for wages. Wages
35have to be high enough to cover basic living costs, otherwise worker do not have
an incentive to work. Similar, prots must also be above a certain minimum
rate. If actual returns were below this rate capitalist would not have an incentive
to invest (Kaldor 1955). The next section introduces other assumptions Kaldor
(Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962) made in order to derive the model.
2.3.1.2 Specic assumption
In regards to the number of workers operating equipment it is assumed that when
equipment has just been installed, the number of workers operating it is at its
highest. The amount of workers operating the new equipment decreases over
its life time because of obsolescence and because of the factors described by the
radioactive depreciation rate. The eects of this on the labour force are described
with the following integral (Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962):
Nt =
Z t
t T
nTe
 (t T)dT (2.30)
For total output Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) derived:
Yt =
Z t
t T
pTnTe
 (t T)dT (2.31)
36Income is either spend on wages or it is treated as prot. Subtracting prots from
income, Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) obtained:
Yt(1   t) = Ntwt (2.32)
Thus, income after prots equals the number of people in the workforce times
average wages. Another useful equation is given by the fact that equipment is
always used up until the point where its prot becomes zero. Accordingly, Kaldor
and Mirrlees (1962) wrote:
pt T = wt (2.33)
Population growth is assumed to be constant and it is represented by  (Kaldor
and Mirrlees 1962):
_ Nt = Nt (2.34)
The last assumption concerns the expectations of entrepreneurs about the devel-
opment of wages. Entrepreneurs expect wages to increase at the same rate as
they have been over the past periods. Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) described the
expected wage rate at some future time T to be:
w

T = wt(
wt
wt   l
)
T t
l (2.35)
37where l is the amount of past periods which the entrepreneurs use to form their
estimation.
2.3.2 Dynamics of the model
2.3.2.1 The steady state
Using the assumptions outlined above, Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) analysed whether
there is a steady state, in which productivity, output, investment and wages grow
at equal rates and where prots, the period of obsolescence of equipment and the
ratio of investment to output remain constant (Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962):
_ p
p
=
_ y
y
=
_ i
i
=
_ w
w
(2.36)
Such a steady state would be consistent with the empirical observations that were
outlined in the introduction of this section and which served as Kaldor's (1957)
motivation of developing a new growth model.
Finding this steady state is simply a mathematical problem. Here, the equations
which have been outlined above can be used. To characterise the steady state
Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) integrated Equation 2.28 using Equation 2.35 and
38obtained the following equation:
it = hpt   wt
evh   1
v
(2.37)
where v represents the expected growth rate of wages. Equation 2.37 describes
that the investment per worker on machine is dependent on the time period during
which investment must be recovered multiplied with the productivity subtracted
by a term that expresses the development of wages. This equation is very useful
to derive a couple of observations (Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962).
First, productivity can only grow faster than investment per worker on machine if
wages are increasing faster than productivity. Otherwise Equation 2.37 would lead
to a higher increase rate in it than in pt. But it is not possible that wages increase
faster than productivity in the long-run, because this would lead to obsolescence
in capital because its operation becomes too expensive (Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962).
Second, productivity can also not grow more slowly than investment per machine
in the long-run. According to Equation 2.37 this would lead to a decline in wages.
The above analysis has pointed out however, that workers will not work if wages
fall below a certain minimum level (Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962).
39Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) also pointed out that if a small deviation of the wage
growth rate from the steady state growth rate occurs then the economy will quickly
move back to the steady state. Based on Equation 2.28 the rate of change of
investment on machine per worker would always increase or decrease depending
on whether it is lower or higher than productivity (Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962).
Therefore, the Kaldor growth model (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962)
predicts a stable equilibrium. The next section looks at the general characteristics
of the model.
2.3.2.2 Characteristics of the model
The equations and assumptions that were outlined above can be used to specify
the characteristics of the model. In particular, Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) were
interested in specifying productivity, wages, output and investment on machine
per worker. To specify these values some mathematical work is required.
The characteristics of the technical progress function suggest that there is some
value 
, where productivity and investment per operative on machine grow at the
same rate (Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962):

 =
_ p
p
=
_ i
i
(2.38)
40Next, Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) characterised the amount of labour available for
new equipment. This is obtained by dierentiating Equation 2.30 with respect to
time. Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) derived the following equation:
nt = _ Nt + Nt + nt T(1  
dT
dt
)e
 T (2.39)
Equation 2.39 demonstrates that the labour force available for new equipment
consists of three factors: The growth of the labour force, represented by _ Nt, the
amount of workers who are unoccupied after a physical accident has destroyed
the equipment they have previously used, represented by Nt, and the amount of
workers who are unoccupied after there previous used equipment became unprof-
itable because of obsolescence, nt T(1   dT
dt )e T (Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962).
Likewise, Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) dierentiated output, which was given in
Equation 2.31:
_ Yt = ptnt   pt Tnt T(1  
dT
dt
)e
 T   Yt (2.40)
Using Equations 2.33 and 2.39 Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) simplied Equation 2.40
to:
_ yt
yt
+  +  = r
pt
yt
  (r      )
wt
yt
(2.41)
Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) proposed that wages grow at a constant rate, . As
41Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) demonstrated, a constant  leads to a constant period
of obsolescence of equipment, if the boundary condition 
 < s
h       is fullled.
Based on this, Equation 2.39 can be turned into the following equation (Kaldor
and Mirrlees 1962):
rt =  +  + rt Te
 (+)T (2.42)
Because T is constant in the above equation, rt will tend to the constant equilib-
rium value
r =
 + 
1   e (+)T (2.43)
Rearranging Equation 2.29, Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) arrived at:
yt = wt +
r
s
it (2.44)
which states that in equilibrium, yt grows at the equilibrium growth rate 
 because
r is constant. Equation 2.44 can be rewritten as:
r
s
i
y
+
w
y
= 1 (2.45)
As expectations are fullled in equilibria, the actual wage equals the expected
wage. Hence, it is now possible to evaluate the integral in Equation 2.28. Using
an initial wage rate w0, it can be written that wt = w0et = w0e
t. Thus (Kaldor
42and Mirrlees 1962):
it = hpt  
e
h   1


wt (2.46)
which Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) rewrote as:
1
h
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y
+
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h
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y
 
p
y
= 0 (2.47)
Equation 2.41 can be rewritten as:
(r      )
w
y
  r
p
y
=  (
 +  + ) (2.48)
Equation 2.33 can now be used to specify T:
e

T =
p
w
=
p=y
w=y
(2.49)
Equation 2.46, Equation 2.47 and Equation 2.48 are employed as simultaneous
equations for the derivation of i
y, w
y , and
p
y. Using the values found by solving the
simultaneous equations Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) arrived at:
e

T =
1  
h(
++)
s
e
h 1

h +


r
1  
h(
++)
s
(2.50)
Furthermore, from Equation 2.43 and because of e
T = (e (+)T)
 


+, Kaldor and
43Mirrlees (1962) wrote:
e

T = [1  
 + 
r
]
 


+ (2.51)
This nishes the construction of the model as all values are now specied. In
summary, the technical progress function determines 
. Next, Equation 2.50 de-
termines T, followed by Equation 2.51 determining r. Then, simultaneous solution
of Equations 2.48 and 2.49 delivers the values of
p
y and w
y . Finally, Equation 2.47
gives the value for i
y (Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962).
From the above analysis it can be seen that besides being the main driver of
economic growth, technological progress has many other eects on the economy.
It also in
uences parameters like for example the share of prots, the rate of
obsolescence or the average lifetime of equipment (Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962)
2.3.3 Kaldor's growth propositions
Based on his economic growth model Kaldor (1966) formulated three growth
propositions. Taylor (2007) summarizes Kaldor's three growth propositions as
followed:
44Box 2.1: Kaldor's (1966) propositions of economic growth
1. There is a strong correlation between the growth of manufacturing output
and rate of growth of GDP.
2. Growth of labour productivity in the manufacturing sector, pm, is pos-
itively related to growth of manufacturing output, gm. Kaldor (1966)
also assumed that growth rate of manufacturing output is equal to the
sum of productivity growth, pm and employment growth, em which can
be expressed as
gm = pm + em (7.1)
where pm =  + gm (7.2)
em =   + (1   )gm (7.3)
Only if equations (7.2) and (7.3) are equal will the estimates be the same.
The sum of the constants of equations (7.2) and (7.3) should be zero, and
the sum of the regression coecients unity, irrespective of the correlations
involved.
3. Overall productivity growth is positively correlated with employment
growth in the manufacturing sector and negatively related with growth
of employment in the non-manufacturing sector.
Source: Taylor (2007), p. 148-149
These growth propositions put a strong emphasis on the manufacturing sector.
Since Kaldor's model (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962) assumed that tech-
nical progress occurs through the implementation of new capital equipment, Kaldor
(1966) advocated that the capital intensive manufacturing sector can experience
45the strongest technological progress of all sectors. In fact, Kaldor (1966) argued
that because the manufacturing sector oers so many possibilities for technological
progress to occur, it experiences increasing returns to scale. Therefore, economic
growth of the manufacturing sector can be very strong. The output it produces
leads to additional demand of good and services and hence drives the economic
growth of the whole economy (Taylor 2007).
2.4 The Romer growth model
The last model to be discussed is the Romer (1986) growth model. The Romer
(1986) model was the rst one of the new growth theory models, which challenge
traditional growth theories. With regards to data on economic growth rates since
the industrialisation Romer (1986, p. 1008) wrote: "...it is useful to ask whether
there is anything in the data that should cause economists to choose a model with di-
minishing returns, falling rates of growth, and convergence across countries rather
than an alternative without these features." Consequently, Romer (1986) provided
an endogenous growth model which advocated increasing returns to scale (Romer
1986).
Similar to Kaldor (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962; Kaldor 1966), Romer
(1986) embodied technological progress into capital. But in contrast to Kaldor
46(Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962; Kaldor 1966), technological progress in
the Romer (1986) model is not driven by the capital investments but by the accu-
mulation of new knowledge. Romer (1986) equipped his model with microeconomic
foundations and treats economic growth as a consumer choice problem, where so-
ciety has to choose between consumption and economic growth. Romer's (1986)
model also suggests a Pareto inecient outcome, which calls for government in-
tervention in order to raise society's wealth.
2.4.1 Assumptions
2.4.1.1 General assumptions
As explained, Romer (1986) assumed increasing returns to scale and hence per
capita output could grow at an increasing rate over time. Romer (1986) provided
historical evidence in order to support this assumption. As Romer (1986) pointed
out, data provided by Maddison (1982) on the productivity level since 1700 had
shown that the productivity growth rate of the country with had the highest level
of productivity is increasing. Another source of evidence is coming from Maddison
(1979) who reported per capita GDP growth rates for the United States from 1800
to 1978. Putting the data into ve subcategories, Romer (1986) demonstrated
that the per capita growth rate is increasing over subsequent time periods. In
addition, Romer (1986) provided results of a simple non-parametric test for trend
47for several countries. Using data from Maddison (1982), Romer (1986) reported a
high probability, that for any two randomly chosen decades, the later decade has
a higher growth rate.
Romer (1986) formalised increasing returns to scale into his model using two as-
sumptions. First, Romer (1986) integrated knowledge into the production function
and assumes that knowledge has an increasing marginal productivity. Second,
Romer (1986) dropped the assumption of diminishing marginal productivity of
capital and labour and postulates that both have constant marginal productivi-
ties. Therefore, driven by the increasing marginal productivity of knowledge, the
production function of these three inputs (capital, labour and knowledge) has in-
creasing returns to scale (Romer 1986).
There are two further important assumptions concerning knowledge. First, Romer
(1986) assumed that knowledge creation exhibits diminishing returns. When one
doubles the inputs in knowledge creation (e.g. research technology), the creation of
new knowledge is not doubled. Second, knowledge is assumed to be an externality.
The reason behind this is that knowledge can never be patented or kept secret to a
full extent. When a rm discovers new knowledge, at least some of this knowledge
will spill-over to other rms. Consequently, new knowledge does not only increase
48the production possibility of the rm which discovered it, it also increases the
production possibilities of other rms. As this suggests that each rm benets
from the research conducted by other rms, knowledge is an externality (Romer
1986).
2.4.1.2 Specic assumptions
The specic assumptions of Romer's (1986) model are outlined in the following.
The production function of a rm is described by the following function:
f(kt;Kt;xt) (2.52)
where kt represents the rm-specic knowledge at time t, Kt is the economy wide
aggregate knowledge at time t, and xt is an aggregation of all other inputs (e.g.
labour and capital) at time t (Romer 1986).
To simplify the derivation of the model, Romer (1986) assumed that the inputs
represented by xt are constant. Furthermore, the rm-specic knowledge of a rm
kt, depends on the path of the economy wide aggregate knowledge Kt.
The production of knowledge involves a trade-o. Given the scarcity of resources,
money can either be spend on consumption or it can be invested in research. Money
49invested in research is denoted with I and the function describing the growth of
rm-specic knowledge is given by (Romer 1986):
_ k = G(I;k)
This function is assumed to be strictly concave and to have constant returns to
scale. Hence, both sides can be divided by k to obtain:
_ k
k
= g(
I
k
) (2.53)
A crucial assumption about Equation 2.53 is that the function is bound from both
above and below. Mathematically, this means that g moves between an interval.
Economically, Equation 2.53 being bound from above means that g experiences
strong diminishing returns as it cannot increase above a given constant . The
bound below is by the value g(0) = 0, because when a rm conducts no research
then k does not change. This implies that knowledge cannot depreciate (Romer
1986).
Incorporating his economic growth model with micro foundations, Romer (1986)
treated it like a consumer choice problem. The utility of a consumer is deter-
mined by his consumption, which the consumer aims to maximise over time. The
50following integral expresses the consumer's utility:
Z 1
0
U(ct)e
 tdt (2.54)
where ct denotes the consumer's consumption and  is the discount factor which
is assumed to be greater than zero. Given the trade-o between consumption and
investment, this is a maximisation problem in mathematical terms.
2.4.2 Dynamics of the model
The consumer choice in Romer's (1986) model is that the economy has to choose
between consumption and economic growth. If the economy chooses high con-
sumption, it will experience low economic growth. In contrast, if it chooses low
consumption, it will experience high growth. The choice between these alterna-
tives is made according to the societies utility. Since the time horizon is innite,
this is a dynamic optimisation problem. To solve for the highest utility, Romer
(1986) used the Hamiltonian approach. Two maximisation problems are outlined:
The rst one characterises the social optimum and the second one the competitive
equilibrium (Romer 1986).
512.4.2.1 The social optimum
This section looks at the social optimum. Here, the perspective of a social planner
is taken. Naturally, a social planner seeks to achieve the Pareto ecient outcome
for the economy as a whole. As outlined above, a crucial assumption of Romer's
(1986) model is that knowledge is an externality. The existence of externalities
requires the social planner to take these into account (Romer 1986).
Therefore, the production function, Equation 2.52, has to be modied. It is spec-
ied that x =  x, where  x denotes the per capita and per rm endowment. It
is assumed that  x is a constant and therefore it is left out for simplicity. Fur-
thermore, Romer (1986) dened S as the amount of consumers and states that
Kt = Stkt. For the social optimum problem the following production function is
derived (Romer 1986):
F(k;Sk;  x) = f(k;Sk) = fso(k) (2.55)
This function is constant over time and convex. Using this production function
the following optimisation problem is obtained (Romer 1986):
52PS1(k) :
maximisation
Z 1
0
U(ct)e
 tdt
subject to
_ kt
kt
= g(
fso(kt)   ct
kt
)
(2.56)
where _ kt  0 for all t  0 and k(0) = k0 (Romer 1986). In words, the goal is to
maximise the utility U, which is determined by a function which uses consumption
c as an input. Thus, the optimal path of consumption, c
t has to be determined.
It is crucial to note that c only serves as a control variable and the real interest is
the optimal path of the state variable, k
t. But mathematically, the path of k
t can
only be obtained by nding the one of the control variable c. Therefore, the rst
task is to determine the optimal path of the control variable and then the optimal
path of the state variable can be derived (Chiang 1992).
Romer (1986) provided a theorem which guarantees that this problem is solvable.
The theorem includes the assumption of a couple of boundaries for fso and g as
well as the assumption of U, f, and g being continuous functions (Romer 1986).
In order to nd the solution to this optimisation problem Romer (1986) employed
53the Hamiltonian approach:
H(k;) = maxcU(c) + [kg(
(fso(k)   c)
k
)] (2.57)
The Hamiltonian function introduces the so called costate variable . The costate
variable measures the shadow price of the state variable. Therefore, it tells us by
how much the utility increases if one unit of k is added. To solve a Hamiltonian
function two conditions have to be satised (Chiang 1992). Romer (1986) em-
ployed these conditions to derive _ k and .
The rst condition is that the dierentiation of the Hamiltonian function with
respect to the state variable k equals the discount rate  multiplied with the
costate variable  minus the derivative of the costate variable  (Chiang 1992):
@H
@k
=    _  (2.58)
=)_  =    Hk(k;) (2.59)
The second condition is that the derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to the
54costate variable  equals the derivative of the state variable _ k (Chiang 1992):
@H
@
= _ k (2.60)
=)_ k = H(k;) (2.61)
These conditions are subject to two boundaries. First, the initial condition k(0) =
k0 and second the transversality condition limt!1 tkte t = 0 (Romer 1986). This
means that at time zero, there is some initial value for knowledge and that when
time goes towards innity, the discounted value for knowledge goes towards zero.
Romer (1986) then proceeded to analyse the path of the control variable c. De-
termining this path enabled him to derive the path of the state variable k. Romer
(1986) postulated that if limc!0 U
0(c) = 1, then the following conditions have to
hold (Romer 1986):
When the constraint _ k  0 is not binding: U
0
(c) = g
0
(
fso(k)   c
k
) (2.62)
When the constraint _ k  0 is binding: c = fso(k) (2.63)
These conditions can then be used to derive equations for _ k and _  that only depend
on k and . Therefore, the dynamic optimisation problem is solved. Romer (1986)
used the following phase plane to show that the social optimum is not reached:
55Figure 2.7: Phase plane for a social optimum
Source: Romer (1986), p. 1022
Figure 2.7 illustrates the state variable k on the horizontal axis and the costate
variable  on the vertical axis. Three curves are shown, one where _ k = 0, one
where _  = 0 and the social optimum SO (Romer 1986).
For the rst case, both conditions (Equation 2.62 and Equation 2.63) have to hold,
because of _ k being equal to zero. Thus, the following equation denes the _ k = 0
curve (Romer 1986):
U
0
(fso(k)) =  (2.64)
56As U was assumed to be concave, the curve of its derivative, U
0 must be a non-
increasing curve (Romer 1986).
For the second case, when H(k;) is investigated along the _ k curve, the equation
for _  can be written as (Romer 1986):
_ 

=    f
0
so(k) (2.65)
From Equation 2.65 it is evident that if f
0
so is increasing without limits, then there
must exist some value of k from where f
0
so(k) > . This value is referred to as
b k in the following. For all the values of k > b k, the _  curve lies above the _ k
curve. Figure 2.7 demonstrates the case where all values of _ k are above b k and the
_  = 0 curve is therefore always above the _ k = 0 curve. The social optimum curve
must also be above the _ k = 0 curve, implying that kt grows without a bound. In
contrast, if the social optimum was crossing the _ k = 0 curve, the transversality
condition would be violated. Therefore it is evident that when rms take the
economy wide knowledge Kt as given, the social optimum is not reached, unless
there is government intervention (Romer 1986).
2.4.2.2 The competitive equilibrium
So what happens in the absence of government intervention? The economy reaches
a suboptimal equilibrium. In this case, Romer (1986) stated the following produc-
57tion function:
F(k;K;  x) = f(k;K) (2.66)
In contrast to the production function for the social optimum (Equation (2.55)),
this production function is concave and time dependent on the path of the economy
wide knowledge Kt (Romer 1986). Therefore, the optimisation problem in this case
is:
P1(K) :
maximisation
Z 1
0
U(ct)e
 tdt
subject to
_ kt
kt
= g(
f(kt;Kt)   ct
kt
);
(2.67)
To solve this optimisation problem, the following Hamiltonian function is used:
~ H(k;;K) = maxcU(c) + [kg(
f(k;K)   c
k
)] (2.68)
Here, the Hamiltonian is denoted as ~ H, in order to distinguish it from the one
used in the social optimum problem. To solve the Hamiltonian function, the same
conditions as above have to be fullled. From these conditions, _ k and _  can be
obtained. In addition, Skt can be substituted for Kt. Therefore, Romer (1986)
58stated:
@ ~ H
@
= _ k (2.69)
=)_ k = ~ H(kt;t;Kt) (2.70)
=)_ k = ~ H(kt;t;Skt) (2.71)
@ ~ H
@k
=    _  (2.72)
=)_  = t   ~ Hk(kt;t;Kt) (2.73)
=)_  = t   ~ Hk(kt;t;Skt) (2.74)
As for the social optimum, these conditions are subject to the boundary conditions
k(0) = k0 and limt!1tkte t = 0.
In addition to the theorem stated above, a further theorem has to be introduced.
This theorem guarantees that for any initial value of knowledge, k0 there is a
value of 0 while the transversality condition is still satised. This ensures that
the equations for _ k and _  determine a unique trajectory through any point in
the phase plane. The theorem therefore species that besides the assumptions of
theorem 1, U, f an g are also assumed to be twice continuously dierentiable.
Furthermore, the theorem characterizes the asymptotic behaviour of the functions
f and g (Romer 1986).
59The analysis involving the phase plane is quite similar to the one for the social
optimum. In fact, using the conditions 2.62 and 2.63 again, the same outcome for
the _ k = 0 curve in the competitive equilibrium as for the social optimum can be
obtained (Romer 1986).
The case is dierent for the equation of _ . While the Hamiltonian function of
the competitive equilibrium is equal to the one of the social optimum (H(k;) =
~ H(k;;Sk)), their derivatives are dierent. For the social optimum, it is f
0
so(k) =
f
0(k;Sk) + Sf
0(k;Sk), while for the competitive equilibrium it is f
0 = f
0(k;Sk).
Consequently, the derivative of the Hamiltonian function of the social optimum is
always larger than the one of the competitive equilibrium. Subsequently, the _  = 0
curve for the competitive equilibrium lies below the one for the social optimum
(Romer 1986).
Therefore, the equilibrium is not Pareto ecient, because rms fail to conduct
enough research. This results from the fact that new knowledge is an externality.
As knowledge can spill over to other rms and increase their production possibil-
ities, rms are less inclined to conduct research themselves. Instead, they choose
to invest their resources elsewhere. As each rm speculates to free-ride on the
60discovery of new knowledge through other rms, aggregate research investment
is too low (Romer 1986). Pareto eciency can be achieved by any intervention
which increases research. Romer (1986) suggested to implement subsidy schemes
in order to reach the social optimum.
2.5 Conclusion
This nishes the review of the growth models which will be used in the forthcoming
chapters to empirically quantify the economic growth of Germany. In summary,
the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) model focuses on capital, labour and technological
progress. It assumes constant returns to scale and diminishing marginal produc-
tivities in capital and labour. As it employs the Cobb-Douglas production function
it can be used to decompose economic growth into capital accumulation, labour
accumulation and technological progress. However, as it does not explain how
technological progress occurs it is an exogenous growth model.
Kaldor's (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962; Kaldor 1966) growth model
diers signicantly to the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) growth model. It is an
endogenous growth model which embodies technological progress into capital re-
placement. Therefore the assumption of diminishing marginal productivity in cap-
ital is dropped and it is argued that capital intense sectors like the manufacturing
61sectors can have increasing returns to scale, because they oer many opportunities
for technological progress.
Romer's (1986) model is also an endogenous growth model which is based on mi-
croeconomic foundations. Romer (1986) assumed increasing returns to scale for
the whole economy and argues that technological progress is a result of knowledge
accumulation.
All three growth models will be estimated in Chapter 4. But before that, the
following chapter provides some information about the political and economic de-
velopment of Germany after the second World War.
62Chapter 3: Germany's historical and eco-
nomic development
3.1 Introduction
This chapter begins by providing some historical information about Germany's
development from 1945 to 2011. This is important for the aim of this thesis, be-
cause Germany's economic growth is deeply related to the most important aspect
of its post-war history: the existence of two Germanies from 1949 to 1990, and
the reunication of these two countries in 1990. The reunication also marks the
disconnection of the two dierent time periods which are analysed empirically in
this thesis.
This chapter is organised as followed: Section 3.2 provides a summary of Ger-
many's historical development from 1945 to 2011. Section 3.3 takes a closer look
at West Germany's economic development from 1945 to 1970. This is followed
by a detailed analysis of the two time periods which are empirically analysed in
this thesis. West Germany's economic development from 1971-1990 is outlined
63in Section 3.4 and the one of the reunited German's is described in Section 3.6.
Furthermore, some economic background information about the reunication is
provided in Section 3.5.
3.2 Post-war political history of Germany
3.2.1 Early post-war years and the foundation of the two
Germanies
After the end of the second world war in 1945, Germany's future was uncertain.
The allies did not have any specic plans of how post-war Germany should look
like. What they did decide so far was the division of Germany into four zones with
each one being administrated by one ally. In addition, they decided to denazify,
demilitarise and democratise Germany. But as specic policy proposals did not
exist, each ally was free to follow its own agenda (Fulbrook 2004).
In the Soviet zone, radical socio-economic changes were implemented. A land re-
form redistributed land to labourers or to state ownership. Large companies were
nationalised and small enterprises were pushed out of business. At the same time,
the Soviet Union extracted signicant amounts of reparations out of its zone. In
addition, the Socialist Unity Party (SED) was created by a forced merger of the
Communist Party (KPD) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in April 1946.
64With the support of the Soviet Union, the SED achieved predominance in political
life in the Soviet Zone over the following years (Fulbrook 2004).
Things were pretty dierent in the western occupation zones. Several political par-
ties were founded or refounded, for example the SPD, the Christian Democratic
Union (CDU) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP). Unlike in the Soviet zone,
there were no severe socio-economic changes and with the exception of France,
the western allies abstained from extracting signicant amounts of reparations.
But a big problem faced by the western occupation powers was feeding the Ger-
man population, which in fact became increasingly dicult with large numbers
of refugees arriving from former German territories, which were now belonging to
Poland (Fulbrook 2004).
In 1947, the USA announced the Marshall Plan, which aimed at reconstructing
Europe and included generous aids to West Germany. Together with the Truman
Doctrine, which was targeted at limiting the Soviet in
uence in Europe, the Mar-
shall Plan was a rst step to integrate West Germany into the community of the
western countries. In addition, England and the USA agreed on merging their
two zones into a Bizone. The Bizone developed its own government and was later
joined by the French zone and became a Trizone (Fulbrook 2004).
65As the old German currency, the Reichsmark was virtually without value, a cur-
rency reform was required. This reform was based on terms, which were unaccept-
able for the Soviet Union. It was implemented in June 1948 and the new currency
was called Deutsche Mark. Later in the same year, the Soviet zone introduced
its own new currency. At this point of time it was clear that the western allies
and the Soviet Union will follow separate paths. After West Germany agreed on a
new constitution, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG or West Germany) was
founded in May 1949. A few months later, the Soviet Zone founded the German
Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany) (Fulbrook 2004).
3.2.2 The history of the two Germanies from 1949 until
the reunication 1990
While West Germany was a representative democracy with free elections, East Ger-
many was controlled by one party, the SED. The rst Chancellor of West Germany
was Konrad Adenauer, who belonged to the CDU which formed a coalition with
the FDP. During Adenauer's reign, Germany experienced an economic miracle,
referring to very strong economic growth rates. Under Adenauer, West Germany
also gained membership in the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation
(OEEC), the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the Council of Europe
66and the European Economic Community (EEC). After gaining full sovereignty in
1955, West Germany joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (Ful-
brook 2004).
East Germany was governed by Walter Ulbricht. During the 1950s it soon became
evident that the socialist East Germany could not keep up with the economic suc-
cess of capitalist West Germany and dissatisfaction with the socialist government
amongst the East German citizens increased. Many East Germans decided to
leave the GDR with the hope to nd a better future in West Germany. The mass
emigration of skilled labour turned into a serious thread for the existence of East
Germany. In the morning of 13th August 1961, East German soldiers began to
construct a wall on the border to West Germany in order to stop the emigration.
This wall made it impossible for East Germans to leave the GDR (Fulbrook 2004).
Besides the end of East German immigration, the 1960s brought further changes
to West Germany. In 1963, Konrad Adenauer resigned as a Chancellor and was
succeeded by Ludwig Erhard, who has been minister for economics before. But
Erhard's government was of short life and collapsed because of weak leadership and
because of a recession which occurred in 1965/66. Kurt Georg Kiesinger from the
CDU became new Chancellor and formed a coalition with the SPD. This coalition
67had a very strong majority in the parliament and provoked the rise of a protest
movement, which mainly consisted of young Germans who were highly critical of
West Germany's society and government (Fulbrook 2004).
The Kiesinger government did not last long either. In 1969, Willy Brandt from the
SPD became Chancellor of a coalition with the FDP. Brandt enforced a change
in West Germany's foreign policy. He emphasised the improvement of the rela-
tions with the Soviet Union and with East Germany, in which Walter Ulbricht
was replaced by Erich Honecker as the SED party leader in 1971. As a result of
Brandt's politics, the FRG and GDR formally agreed on recognising each other.
Subsequently, both countries became full members of the United Nations in 1973
(Fulbrook 2004).
Domestically, West Germany faced a couple of serious challenges during the 1970s.
A terrorist movement, the Red Army Fraction (RAF), which originated from the
protest movement of the 1960s spread fear among citizens and created worries
about the stability of the German democracy. In addition, the oil crisis of 1973
and a world recession gave rise to many economic problems. Willy Brandt had to
resign as the Chancellor because of a spy aair in 1974. Brandt's fellow party mem-
ber Helmut Schmidt became the new Chancellor. During the time of Schmidt's
68government West Germany was confronted by the most severe terrorist attacks
in the history of the RAF, it suered from rising unemployment and struggled
with budget problems which soon started to challenge the existence of the welfare
system. In 1982, the FDP decided to leave the coalition in order to form a new
government with the CDU. The new Chancellor was Helmut Kohl (Fulbrook 2004).
During the 1980s the European integration was enforced. In 1987 the member
states agreed on forming the Single European Market (SEM). Like within a coun-
try, goods, services, capital and people were ought to move freely within the SEM.
The deadline to enforce the SEM was the 31 December 1992 (Ardy and El-Agraa
2011).
East Germany also underwent some changes during the leadership of Honecker
from 1971 to 1989. Consumer satisfaction became a more important concern and
the government thrived to increase the availability of desired goods like TVs and
cars. From the 1980s onwards it also became easier for East Germans to travel to
the west (Fulbrook 2004).
But during the 1980s it became obvious that the Soviet Union would lose the cold
war. Its economic weakness made it impossible to continue competing with the
69US in terms of defense spending. At the same time the Soviet leader Gorbachev
introduced reforms which started a process of democratisation and economic re-
structuring. Other east European countries underwent reforms as well. When a
new government in Hungary decided to waive visa restrictions of East Germans to
travel to the west, it induced a process which would eventually lead to the German
reunication (Fulbrook 2004).
First, the high numbers of East Germans going to Hungary in order to emigrate
to West Germany became a problem. Then, demonstrations against the SED gov-
ernment in East Germany started and under the pressure of Gorbachev, Honecker
had to resign as a party leader and he was replaced by Egon Krenz. Neverthe-
less, the demonstrations did not end. In fact, they actually kept increasing in
size and thus raised the pressure on the SED government. In an eort to calm
things down, an East German government spokesman announced the relaxation
of travel restrictions for East Germans from 9th November 1989 onwards. As this
announcement implied that the wall which divided East Germany from the West
lost its purpose, thousands of East and West Germans rushed to the wall to tore
it down. In the following weeks, the stream of refugees 
eeing from the East to
the West was so strong that some kind of solution was necessary. West Germany's
Chancellor Kohl took the opportunity and suggested a unication of the two Ger-
70manies. After negotiations between East and West Germany, as well as between
West Germany and the allies, the two Germanies agreed on reuniting. The rst
step was the formation of an economic and monetary union which came to power
in July 1990. The reunication was completed by the formation of a political union
on 3rd October 1990 (Fulbrook 2004).
3.2.3 Germany since 1990
The reunited Germany adopted the West German constitution and economic sys-
tem. It was challenging for both policy makers and citizens to integrate a socialist
country into a capitalist country. The high cost of the reunication also made tax
increases necessary (Fulbrook 2004).
In 1992 the European integration made further progress. Through the Maastricht
Treaty members of the European Union (EU) agreed on forming an economic
and monetary union (EMU). The aim was to establish a common monetary pol-
icy, conducted by the yet to establish European Central Bank (ECB) and similar
economic policies. Ultimately, a common currency should be introduced. These
measures were to be implemented in three dierent stages over the following few
years (Mayes and El-Agraa 2011).
71Chancellor Kohl lost the election in 1998. A new government was formed by the
SPD and the Greens and Gerhard Schr oder became new Chancellor (Fulbrook
2004). On the 1st January 1999 the Euro became the new currency (European
Commission 2002). After years of slow economic growth and high unemployment,
the Schr oder government started to implement a fundamental reform of the Ger-
man welfare state in 2003 (Jacobi and Kluve 2006). Schr oder lost the following
election in 2005 and Angela Merkel from the CDU became the new Chancellor.
She formed a coalition with the SPD. After the election in 2009 the FDP replaced
the SPD as the coalition partner. In the same year, Germany experienced its
worst post-war recession, as a consequence of the global nancial crisis (OECD
2012; Maddison 1991). The nancial crisis led to enormously high budget decits
of some countries of the European Monetary Union. As some of these countries
already had very high levels of debt before the nancial crisis these increasingly
high decits started to threat their ability to renance themselves. This led to the
Euro crisis which became a serious threat for the existence of the common currency.
3.3 Economic history of West-Germany from 1945
to 1970
After having introduced the political history, the following sections take a closer
look at the economic developments. As this thesis is only analysing West Ger-
72many's growth and the one of the reunited Germany, this section looks at the
West German economic development from 1945 to 1970 and ignores the economic
development in East Germany. The information provided in this section will help
to put the West German economic development during the time period from 1971
to 1990 into context.
3.3.1 Currency reform and the social market economy
In the early post-war years, most Germans did not believe in capitalism. There-
fore, they wanted West Germany to implement a socialist system. A socialist West
Germany was also favoured by the British and French, because they believed that
a socialist Germany would not be as dangerous as a capitalist one. But Americans
had other plans for West Germany's economic future. In 1948, they appointed the
economist Ludwig Erhard as economic director of the Economic Council. Erhard,
a proponent of the free market, had a big in
uence on the West German economic
development over the following two decades (Bark and Gress 1993b).
At the time of Erhard's appointment approximately half of the trading occurred on
the black market. The ocial currency, the Reichsmark was basically worthless,
because of the strong expansion of the money supply during war. In fact, West
Germans were actually using cigarettes and chocolate as their currency. There-
73fore, Erhard and the leadership of the Trizone decided to implement a currency
reform (Carlin 1996). The new currency, the Deutsche Mark was printed in the
US and was introduced promptly after its announcement. The enforced exchange
with a devalued Reichsmark was a success. It ended the black market and led to a
redistribution of wealth in which holders of real assets were favoured at the cost of
holders of nancial assets. In addition, the currency reform lled the shops with
products which were withheld from trade before (Carlin 1996). The introduction
of a new currency also had important psychological eects. Together with the an-
nouncement of the Marshal plan it increased the condence in a better economic
future for West Germany. Simultaneously to the implementation of the currency
reform, Erhard also stopped price controls and rationing, which both were mea-
sures that were normally only used in command economies (Bark and Gress 1993b).
The currency reform could only be a rst step towards a more prosperous future.
In fact, while shops were now oering products they have not been oering before,
Germans did not possess the money to buy these products. The currency reform
also led to an increase in unemployment over the following months because em-
ployers did not have enough money to pay wages to their workers (Bark and Gress
1993b).
74Besides implementing the currency reform, Erhard also designed the economic
system of West Germany - the Social Market Economy. This system is based
on ordo-liberal ideas put forward by the German economist Walter Eucken and a
group of other scholars. While they advocate an economic system which is anti-
interventionist and guided by the price mechanism, they also demand a strong
state to enforce social responsibility. Completely free markets are rejected on the
grounds that they can give too much power to monopolies, unions or other groups
which then have the potential to undermine the free market for self benet (Tribe
1995 and Carlin 1996).
3.3.2 The economic performance from 1950 to 1970
Both the currency reform and the social market economy were a good basis for
economic success. Figure 3.1 shows West Germany's economic growth from 1950
to 1970:
75Figure 3.1: RGDP growth rate, West Germany 1950-1970
Source: Maddison (1991)
Figure 3.1 shows that with the exception of 1958, West German economic growth
during the 1950s was extremely strong. The average growth rate during this decade
was 8.50 per cent1. Economic growth slowed down over the 1960s, but it was still
at a fairly strong 4.89 per cent on average, even though West Germany experi-
enced a mild recession in 1967. After the recession growth accelerated quickly and
the economy grew by more than 5 per cent in the last three years of the time
period. In total, average economic growth was at 6.68 per cent over the period
from 1950-1970 (Maddison 1991).
1This refers to the geometric average. All averages in this thesis are given as the geometric
average, because it is a better measure than the arithmetic average when dealing with time-series
data.
76At the same time unemployment declined signicantly, as shown by Figure 3.2:
Figure 3.2: Unemployment rate, West Germany 1950-1970
Source: Maddison (1991)
Figure 3.2 illustrates that while unemployment was at over 8 per cent in 1950, it
dropped to 1 per cent in only ten years time and it then fell even further to 0.5
per cent in 1965. During the recession it increased to 1.7 per cent, but fell to its
pre-recession level soon after (Maddison 1991).
3.3.3 The economic miracle
West Germany's remarkable economic performance from 1950 to 1966 is commonly
referred to as the Wirtschaftswunder, or the economic miracle (Wolf 1995). What
77are the reasons behind West Germany's extraordinarily strong economic perfor-
mance? While the Marshall plan, the currency reform and the German economic
system served as a good foundation for economic success, they were not the fac-
tors which triggered the economic miracle. The literature credits the strong growth
rates to two other factors. One is the Korean War, from which the West Germany
economy beneted strongly. While the US, England and Western European coun-
tries used almost all over their production capabilities to create goods needed for
the Korean War, West Germany had a lot of free production capacities. It started
to use these capacities in order to produce industrial goods such as machine tools,
steel and construction equipment. As the other countries used all their resources
producing war material, the international demand for these industrial goods was
very high. Because West Germany was able to sell so many of these goods, it
regained its leadership in many of its traditional markets (Bark and Gress 1993b).
The strong demand also enabled strong investments into new capital equipment,
leading to a comparable young capital stock and hence a higher productivity (Car-
lin 1996).
The second reason for the extraordinary growth rates was that West Germany
beneted enormously from the immense in
ow of highly educated workers coming
from East Germany. Many of the East German immigrants were engineers or doc-
78tors. Through the in
ow of free human capital West Germany did not only save
money on education, it also gained from the increasing consumer demand. The
mass immigration of highly trained human capital has actually often been identi-
ed as the main reason why West Germany did not experience just an economic
boom but a miracle (Bark and Gress 1993b).
As noted above, the mass in
ow of East Germans ended with the construction of
the Wall in 1961 (Bark and Gress 1993b). To address the resulting labour shortage,
West Germany started to recruit foreign workers from other countries. However,
most of these foreign workers had very low qualications and worked in low-skilled
industry jobs (Carlin 1996).
Economic growth was also strongly supported by the housing market. As re-
constructing was still ongoing and with the big stream of immigrants arriving in
Germany, the demand for new houses and 
ats was high (Bark and Gress 1993b).
3.3.4 The rst recession
The period of the economic miracle ended when West Germany entered its rst
recession in 1966/67. While output decreased only modestly, unemployment in-
creased from 0.6 per cent to 1.7 per cent during this time (Maddison 1991). In
79response to the recession the Kiesinger government implemented the Law to pro-
mote stability and growth to the economy. This law established greater government
in
uence in economic planning and was conform with the belief of many German
policy makers of the late 1960s which advocated that business cycles and economic
growth could be controlled by direct government action. Therefore, it marked a
change in West German economic policy making, because the stabilisation law
violated the rules of the social market economy (Bark and Gress 1993a).
A positive eect of the recession was that it led to an increase in productivity over
subsequent years, because it revealed over and misinvestments. In addition, it led
to an improvement in the allocation of labour between industries (Carlin 1996).
Therefore, economic growth reached high levels again and the unemployment rate
fell quickly, as indicated previously in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2.
However, from the mid 60s onwards, the government subsequently increased its
expenditure, often at rates higher than economic growth. This is in particular true
for the Brandt government, which took power in 1969 (Bark and Gress 1993a).
803.4 Trend analysis: West Germany from 1971 to
1990
This section will look at West Germany's economic performance from 1971 to 1990
in more detail. The aim is investigate patterns and reasons for these patterns be-
fore this time period is analysed empirically. First, it is looked at the developments
of real GDP growth, growth in net capital stock and employment. Then possible
reasons which were found in the literature are discussed. The information provided
will help interpreting the empirical results.
3.4.1 The evolution of RGDP, the net capital stock and
employment
3.4.1.1 RGDP
Figure 3.3 demonstrates the change in RGDP:
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82The average economic growth of West Germany over this time period was 2.61 per
cent, which is a lot lower than the 6.68 per cent it had experienced over the period
from 1950 to 1970. As Figure 3.3 shows, the economy grew strongly with growth
rates of more than 3 per cent in the rst three illustrated years. Then growth
declined and West Germany suered from a recession in 1975. After the recession
growth accelerated quickly and the economy grew steadily during the years from
1976 to 1979. This was followed by fairly weak growth in the years from 1980 to
1987, including another recession in 1982. After 1987 the West Germany economy
started to grow strongly again, leading to its highest GDP growth in the illustrated
period in the year of 1990. Overall, it can be seen that the RGDP trend was very
volatile during this time period.
Figure 3.4 and Table 3.1 decompose the RGDP evolution into agriculture, industry
and selected service sectors:2
2It is important to note that some sectors have been omitted and the numbers will therefore
not add up to total RGDP. The same applies to all other decompositions including capital and
labour in the remainder of this chapter.
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84Table 3.1: Decomposition of RGDP into key sectors, West Germany
1971-1990
RGDP Agriculture Industry Selected
Service
Sectors
Average growth 2.61% 1.50% 1.17% 3.59%
Share 1971 100.00% 1.15% 28.99% 46.66%
Share 1990 100.00% 0.94% 25.21% 55.39%
Source: OECD (2012)
From Figure 3.4 and from Table 3.1 it can be seen that the selected service in-
dustries have the highest share in RGDP and that this aggregate experienced the
strongest economic growth. In fact, the economic growth rate of the selected ser-
vice sectors was more than three times as big as the one of the industry sector and
more than double as big as the one of the agricultural sector. The share of the
agricultural sector is by far the lowest, and it decreased further over the sample
period. The share of the industry sector decreased slightly and the one of the
selected service sectors increased by almost 10 per cent.
3.4.1.2 Net Capital Stock
Figure 3.5 shows the evolution of the net capital stock:
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86The net capital stock grew by only 0.33 per cent on average over the sample pe-
riod. Figure 3.5 shows that in the rst three years the net capital stock growth
was around 2 per cent. But this growth slowed down in 1974 and 75, where West
Germany experienced a recession as explained above. In the following ve years
the net capital stock growth was slightly above 0.50 per cent which is far below to
what it had been before the recession. In 1980, which was one year after economic
growth started to weaken, the capital stock growth declined to even lower levels.
In fact, from 1982 onwards, which is the year of the recession, the net capital
stock decreased. Net capital stock growth remained negative until the end of the
time period and achieved its lowest value of around -0.7 per cent in 1987. From
1987 onwards the net capital stock growth increased slightly. In summary it is
learnt that the two recessions had strong and persistent adverse eects on West
Germany's capital stock growth.
Figure 3.6 and Table 3.2 provide insights on West Germany's capital formation:
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88Table 3.2: Decomposition of Gross Fixed Capital formation, West Ger-
many 1971-1990
Gross xed
capital
formation
Metal
products
and
machinery
Transport
equipment
Housing Other con-
structions
Average growth 1.78% 2.98% 1.88% 1.12% 0.32%
Share 1971 100.00% 19.92% 9.68% 36.69% 40.67%
Share 1990 100.00% 25.51% 10.16% 30.90% 31.18%
Source: OECD (2012)
Looking at Figure 3.6 and Table 3.2 it can be seen that gross xed capital forma-
tion increased over the sample period. However, it is shown to be very volatile.
Two downward movements can be identied in 1974/75 and in 1980/81 which
falls together with the two recessions. After both recessions an increasing trend is
apparent.
Figure 3.6 and Table 3.2 also demonstrate that most investments went into hous-
ing or other constructions. However, an increasingly share of investments was
absorbed by metal products and machineries, especially during the 1980s. This
is surprising given the fact that the previous section has demonstrated that the
share of the industry in relation to RGDP was decreasing. It can also be seen that
the importance of both housing and other constructions is declining, because both
89sectors experienced a lower growth rate than total gross xed capital formation
did.
3.4.1.3 Employment
Figure 3.7 shows the development of employment over the sample period:
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91On average, employment increased by 0.48 per cent on average over the total sam-
ple period. Figure 3.7 indicates that employment grew over the rst three years
of the sample period. As outlined above, West Germany experienced strong eco-
nomic growth during these years. Employment decreased in the year from 1974 to
1976 with the decrease in 1975 being especially strong. This development is in line
with the observations about the developments of GDP and capital stock growth.
However, it can be seen that the recession aected employment more strongly
than RGDP and capital stock growth. From 1977 to 1980 employment increased
again. This recovery in employment is lagging one year behind the recovery in
terms of RGDP growth. The second recession brought another decrease of em-
ployment. This time it lasted four years, but the strongest decrease in 1983 was
not as severe as the one in 1975. From 1985 onwards total employment started
to increase. Strong growth rates were achieved in the years of 1986 and 1989,
and a very strong growth occurred in 1990 during which RGDP growth was also
extraordinarily strong.
Figure 3.8 and Table 3.8 decompose total employment into three dierent sectors:
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93Table 3.3: Decomposition of Employment, West Germany 1972-1989
Total Agriculture Manufacturing Selected
Service Sectors
Growth rate 0.22% -3.99% -0.69% 1.16%
Share 1972 100.00% 7.70% 36.82% 44.54%
Share 1989 100.00% 3.71% 31.56% 56.51%
Source: International Labour Organization Department of Statistics (2012)
Attention should be drawn to the fact that Figure 3.8 and Table 3.8 do not include
the years 1971 and 1990, because no data was available for these years. Table 3.8
shows that during this sample period employment in the selected service sectors
increased by over one per cent on average. In contrast, employment in agricul-
ture decreased strongly and employment in manufacturing decreased modestly.
Therefore, West Germany's economy experienced a structural change in terms of
employment. In addition, as it was shown before that both the RGDP of agricul-
ture and the RGDP of industry were rising and because of increasing investments
into machinery, it appears that labour saving technological progress was occurring
in both sectors.
3.4.1.4 Summary
Figure 3.9 shows the evolution of the RGDP, net capital stock and employment in
one graph:
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95Figure 3.9 shows a strong positive correlation between RGDP and employment
growth with employment lagging behind RGDP growth. In contrast to RGDP
and employment growth, the capital growth is moving quite smoothly, but its cor-
relation with the other factors is quite weak. The following sections are explaining
the reasons behind the observed trends.
3.4.2 In
ation and the rst Oil-Crisis
The strong economic growth from 1970 to 1974 was a consequence of the 1966/67
recession. The 1966/67 recession had spurred on the restructuring of the produc-
tion capacity of West Germany's economy leading to a signicant rise in produc-
tivity growth (Bark and Gress 1993a). A problem for the West German economy
during the 1970s, however, was the in
ation rate which reached pretty high levels
as demonstrated by Figure 3.10:
96Figure 3.10: In
ation rate, West Germany 1967-1990
Source: OECD (2012)
Figure 3.10 illustrates that after experiencing low in
ation rates of less than two
per cent in the rst three years, in
ation steadily rose up until 1973. The raising
in
ation rates were a result from the increasing spending of the Brandt government
and from high wage demands of the unions (Bark and Gress 1993a). The price
levels were pushed even further when an oil embargo of the oil exporting Arab
states in 1973 increased the oil price to four times its average value from 1972
(Maddison 1991). This led the in
ation rate to climb to levels of around 7 per
cent in both 1973 and 1974. Energy prices became higher than they had ever been
97before and this hit the West German economy with its energy consuming industry
at a very sensitive spot. Besides production becoming more expensive, some of
West Germany's capital stock also became obsolete, because the new energy prices
made its usage simply unprotable (Siebert 2005).
The decrease of the West German production capacity led to a constant loss in
purchasing power (Siebert 2005). As a result, West Germany was experiencing a
recession in 1975 and unemployment rose from around 1 per cent in 1973 to over 4
per cent in 1975 (OECD 2012). Given the high in
ation and increasing unemploy-
ment, Germany was suering from stag
ation. The high in
ation rates also made
new investments fairly unattractive. After 1974, in
ation started to decrease but
it remained on higher than normal levels.
The rst oil-crisis was an important lesson to West Germany because it highlighted
its dependence of the oil exporting countries. Over the following years both the
government and enterprises worked hard on decreasing this dependence. For ex-
ample, companies focused on decreasing the oil consumption of their capital stock.
In addition West Germans became more responsible with their energy consump-
tion. As a result the overall energy consumption decreased and West Germany
even managed to achieve a trade surplus with some of the oil exporting countries
98(Bark and Gress 1993a).
3.4.3 Years of weakening economic growth and the second
Oil-Crisis
The rst oil price shock has marked the beginning of a period during which the
extraordinary post-war economic growth rates became unreachable. Comparing
Figure 3.1 with Figure 3.3 it is clearly evident that the strength of economic
growth declined. This was not only the case for West Germany, but also for the
other OECD countries (Maddison 1995).
Maddison (1995) identied various reasons for the weak economic growth of West
Germany and other OECD countries during this time. Besides the already men-
tioned oil price shocks the downfall of the Bretton Woods xed exchange rate
system in 1971 also had a weakening eect on economic growth during this time.
Both policy makers and entrepreneurs had to learn how to deal with 
oating ex-
change rates. Therefore, there was a transitional period during which stakeholders
were adapting to the new system. Similar to this, there was also a general cau-
tion among policy makers which resulted from the disappearance of the consensus
on macroeconomic theory, like the Philips-curve. Whereas the Philips-curve had
been a trusted policy tool during the 1960s, policy makers were becoming more
99and more unsure about the Philips-curve's applicability in particular and Keyne-
sian policies in general (Maddison 1995).
Nevertheless, one of the most important reasons for West Germany's slowing eco-
nomic growth is illustrated in Table 3.4:
Table 3.4: Level of GDP per man hour - Comparison West Germany
and USA, 1950-1982
1950 1960 1973 1982
West Germany 36 55 77 94
USA 100 100 100 100
Source: Maddison (1995)
Table 3.4 shows the West German level of GDP per man hour in relation to the US
level, which was the highest level in productivity of all countries. It can be seen
that West Germany's productivity as proxied by man hours was far behind the one
of the US during the 1950s and 60s. Hence, it was fairly easy for West Germany to
increase its productivity because it could simply implement the existing advances
in production technology which were already being used by other countries like
the US. Therefore, productivity increased quickly and the West German economy
was growing strongly. However, as West Germany's productivity approached US
levels, the catch-up bonus disappeared. West Germany now had to implement
new production techniques at the speed at which these advances were being made.
100Therefore, economic growth slowed down (Maddison 1995).
From 1978 rising in
ation rates became a concern again as previously shown in
Figure 3.10. Since West Germany's economy was very dependent on its exports,
the decrease in competitiveness through the increase in prices was very harmful to
its economic growth. In 1980 a second oil price shock occurred (Bark and Gress
1993a). Like the rst oil crisis, it led to a decrease in employment and investment
and to a recession, which occurred in 1982. As a result unemployment reached 8
per cent in 1983 as shown by Figure 3.11:
Figure 3.11: Unemployment rate, West Germany 1971-1990
Source: OECD (2012)
101The high unemployment led to increasing government expenditure, because more
people had to be supported by the welfare system. As in
ation continued to be
high, West Germany began to experience another stag
ation (Siebert 2005).
3.4.4 The recovery of the 1980s
From 1981 onwards, the in
ation rate started to decrease. One reason was that
wage demands of the unions were very moderate. In addition, the Kohl government
managed to achieve a surplus in the federal budget, after years of decits. At the
same time the economy was stimulated through tax cuts which were implemented
over several steps (Siebert 2005). As a consequence economic success returned to
West Germany. It achieved strong GDP growth and increasing employment, as
demonstrated by previously by Figure 3.9. Therefore, unemployment started to
fall as shown previously by Figure 3.11. The next sections oers some details on
the German reunication.
3.5 The reunication
West Germany and East Germany reunited in 1990. The German Economic,
Monetary and Social Union (GEMSU) took eect on 1. July 1990, whereas the
political union started on 3. October 1990. Compared to the capitalist West Ger-
man economy, the socialist East German economy was extremely backwards and
102it was estimated that East Germany's per capita GDP was only one third of West
Germany's at the time of the reunication (Lange and Pugh 1998). In addition
the GDR was basically bankrupt (Bark and Gress 1993a).
The West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl was warned by many economists about
implementing the economic and the political unication too quickly, because it
would lead to enormous costs (Lange and Pugh 1998). But to Chancellor Kohl it
was clear that once the chance for the reunication was given it had to be taken
and acted upon immediately. Furthermore, the German population wanted the
reunication at whatever the cost would involve (Bark and Gress 1993a).
With the GEMSU the Deutsche Mark became the currency of the GDR. The con-
version rate of the East German to the West German Mark was set to 1 to 1. In
addition, the West German welfare system was extended to cover East Germans
and East Germany adopted the social market economy. This meant that most
East German state-owned enterprises had to be privatised. The privatisation was
managed by the Treuhandanstalt (Lange and Pugh 1998).
For the East German economy, the reunication led to what Akerlof et al. (1991,
p. 5) have called a depression 'without historic precedent'. By December 1990,
103production of goods had fallen to 46 per cent of its 1989 level and unemployment
was increasing rapidly. Several reasons were behind this. First, East German
companies were not able to survive in a competitive environment. Their capital
equipment was too old and their wage expenditure was too high (Akerlof et al.
1991). They were also suering enormously from the consequences of the 1 to 1
conversion rate, because this implied an appreciation of the East German Mark of
over 400 per cent (European Commission 2002). The conversion rate also set wrong
wage expectations among East Germans, leading to unrealistic demands in wage
negotiations. As the West German institutional framework of collective bargain-
ing was applied to East Germany, West German unions achieved wage increases
for East Germans, which were totally out of line with East German productivity.
This made East Germany very unattractive for investments (Siebert 2005).
Further reasons for the severe downturn were the collapse of traditional East Ger-
man trading patters resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union. With the end
of the GDR East German companies were also cut-o from their usual source of
credit (the government) and they were suddenly exposed to an economic environ-
ment which was absolutely new to them (Lange and Pugh 1998).
These developments demonstrated the German government that the costs of the
104reunication were higher than expected. As a consequence, Chancellor Kohl had
to break his promise that no tax increases were necessary in order to nance the
reunication. The tax increases were implemented in 1991 (Bark and Gress 1993a).
After having shed some light on the economic implications of the reunication on
the East German economy, the next section looks at the economic development of
Germany over the following period.
3.6 Trend analysis: Germany from 1992 to 2011
The time period from 1992 to 2011 is the second period which is analysed em-
pirically in this thesis. The year of 1991 is excluded from the empirical analysis,
because as a result of the reunication, both the labour stock and the capital
stock experienced very strong changes, which would bias the estimations. In ad-
dition, it was impossible to aggregate a robust estimate of the capital stock in 1991.
Like before, the general trends are outlined rst and then the reasons will be
analysed.
1053.6.1 The evolution of RGDP, the net capital stock and
employment
3.6.1.1 RGDP
Figure 3.12 shows the development of RGDP from 1992 to 2011:
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107Germany's RGDP grew by 1.33 per cent on average over the sample period, which
is fairly weak. Figure 3.12 indicates that shortly after the reunication the economy
was hit by a recession in 1993, where RGDP contracted by one per cent. Following
the recession, Germany experienced eight years of weak economic growth, with the
exception of 1994 and 2000, where growth was strong. RGDP contradicted again
in 2002 and 2003. This was followed by ve years of economic growth, includ-
ing two years of growth higher than 3 per cent. In 2009, Germany was hit by a
massive recession, where GDP declined by slightly more than 5 per cent, which
is by far the strongest recession it has experienced in its post-war history (OECD
2012; Maddison 1991). In 2010 and 2011 the German economy recovered, achiev-
ing growth rates higher than 3 per cent in both years. But in total, Germany's
economic growth performance in the time period from 1992 to 2011 could not keep
up with the one of the time period from 1971 to 1990.
Figure 3.13 and Table 3.5 show the decomposition of RGDP into selected time
periods for 1992 to 2010 (there was no data available for 2011):
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109Table 3.5: Decomposition of RGDP into key sectors, Germany 1992-
2010
RGDP Agriculture Industry Selected
Service
Sectors
Average growth 1.24% 0.18% 0.34% 2.11%
Share 1992 100.00% 0.84% 23.89% 57.18%
Share 2010 100.00% 0.72% 20.97% 65.84%
Source: OECD (2012)
Figure 3.13 shows that the gross value added of the industrial sector decreased
after the reunication and again during the nancial crisis. Regarding the overall
development of the industrial sector over this time period Table 3.5 indicates a
very weak growth of 0.34 per cent. The agricultural sector grew even less strongly
than that. Only the aggregate of the selected service sectors grew at a moderate
rate of over 2 per cent. In comparison to the previous time period the growth of
all sectors was weaker: the agricultural sector by roughly 1.3 per cent, the growth
of the industrial sector by around 0.8 per cent and the one of the selected service
sectors by roughly 1.5 per cent.
The development of the shares of the sectors to total RGDP is similar to the
one of the period from 1971 to 1990. The share of both agriculture and industry
decreased and the share of the selected service sectors increased. In addition it
can be seen that the share of the agricultural sector in 1992 was marginally higher
110than it was in 1990, which is a result of the reunication, because East Germany
had a strong agricultural sector.
3.6.1.2 Net Capital Stock
Looking at the development of the capital stock, which is shown in Figure 3.14, a
strong negative trend is apparent:
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112Over the total period the net capital stock decreased by 0.88 per cent on average.
After a weak growth in 1992 the net capital stock started to decrease during the
recession of 1993. The decline of the net capital stock became stronger over the
subsequent years and then remained at around -0.80 per cent for the years from
1998 to 2000. After 2000 the decline became stronger again and reached -1.40 per
cent in 2005. During this time span economic growth was very weak as shown
previously by Figure 3.12. In the years that followed 2005 the decline of the net
capital stock growth was less strong but it remained far below positive growth
rates.
Figure 3.15 and Table 3.6 are showing the decomposition of the gross xed capital
formation:
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114Table 3.6: Decomposition of Gross Fixed Capital formation, Germany
1992-2011
Gross xed
capital
formation
Metal
products
and
machinery
Transport
equipment
Housing Other con-
structions
Average growth 0.92% 1.84% 1.08% 0.52% -0.67%
Share 1992 100.00% 24.35% 9.86% 32.23% 31.58%
Share 2011 100.00% 30.78% 11.91% 28.29% 21.71%
Source: OECD (2012)
In total, gross xed capital formation increased by slightly less than one per cent
over the sample period as indicated by Table 3.6. This growth is around 0.80 per
cent below the growth rate of the period from 1971 to 1990. From Figure 3.15 it
can be seen that the gross xed capital formation decreased at the same time as
RGDP decreased as previously indicated by Figure 3.12.
As Table 3.6 illustrates, investments into metal products and machinery increased
the strongest over the time period. Therefore, the trend of the previous period
continued. At the end of the period investments into metal products and machinery
actually had the highest share in total investment. In regards to other investments,
investments in housing grew very weakly and investments into other constructions
declined over the sample period.
1153.6.1.3 Employment
Lastly, looking at employment the overall impression from Figure 3.16 is that the
evolution in employment was very erratic:
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117Figure 3.16 highlights that employment decreases by more than 1 per cent in both
1992 and 1993. During the years 1994, 1996 and 1997 employment continued
to decrease, but at a smaller rate. In 1998 employment increased strongly, even
though no extraordinarily strong increase in GDP was observed for that year. This
increase in employment was rst followed by a decrease and then by two years dur-
ing which employment increased. During 2002 and 2003 employment decreased
strongly, but this was followed by four years where it increased strongly. These
four years of strong growth in employment fell together with a time during which
RGDP also increased, as previously shown in Figure 3.12. Surprisingly, employ-
ment decreased only modestly in 2009, which was the year during which Germany
suered from its worst post war recession. Following the recession employment
increased slightly in 2010, but in 2011 it decreased again. The average growth rate
in employment over the whole period was 0.16 per cent, which is very weak and
less than in the time period of 1971 to 1990.
Figure 3.17 and Table 3.17 decompose total employment into three sectors:
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119Table 3.7: Decomposition of Employment, Germany 1992-2008
Total Agriculture Manufacturing Selected
Service
Sectors
Avg. change rate 0.30% -2.82% -1.48% 1.38%
Share 1992 100.00% 3.73% 29.29% 57.29%
Share 2008 100.00% 2.25% 21.99% 68.08%
Source: International Labour Organization Department of Statistics (2012)
Table 3.7 shows that employment in manufacturing decreased by over one per cent
on average, resulting in a decrease to a share of roughly one fth of total employ-
ment in 2008. The agricultural sector suered from an even stronger decrease,
with average growth rates of almost minus three per cent. The employment of
the selected service sectors increased. Therefore, the structural change which was
already observed for the period of 1971 to 1990 continued.
3.6.1.4 Summary
Figure 3.18 shows the evolution of RGDP, the net capital stock and employment
in one graph:
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121As for the period from 1971 to 1990, a positive correlation between GDP growth
and employment growth can be observed in Figure 3.18, but the correlation appears
to be less strong than it was in the period from 1971 to 1990. There is also a
correlation between capital stock growth and RGDP growth, but it seem to be
very weak. After having set out the general trends the following section looks at
the reasons behind these developments.
3.6.2 The rst few years after reunication
The low economic growth rates during the 1990s had a couple of reasons. One
reason was the severe economic depression in East Germany following the reuni-
cation. This strong economic downfall in East Germany aected the performance
of the whole German economy. In addition, the reunication led to a decline in
competitiveness. This was especially challenging as Germany was now compet-
ing on the Single European Market, where goods, capital and people could move
freely across the participating European countries. Having to bear the huge cost of
the reunication, which had required tax increases, made it very hard to succeed
in such a competitive economic environment (Carlin 2009). Another reason for
slow growth was the strong appreciation of the Deutsche Mark in the beginning of
the 1990s (European Commission 2002). This made goods produced in Germany
more expensive. In addition, domestic demand, especially private consumption
122and construction investment, was fairly weak during the 1990s (European Com-
mission 2002).
Therefore, the low economic growth rates during the 1990s were not surprising.
The recession which occurred in 1993 as indicated by Figure 3.12 was mainly a con-
sequence of a general downturn of the world economy in 1992 (Siebert 2005). As
a consequence of the weak economic growth performance employment decreased.
Figure 3.19 illustrates that this led to an increase of unemployment from 5 per
cent in 1990 to almost 10 per cent in 1997:
Figure 3.19: Unemployment Rate, Germany 1990-1999
Source: OECD (2012)
1233.6.3 Limited policy measures to stimulate growth
Germany's economic tools to ght the weakness were fairly limited. The EMU
member states were now conducting a common European monetary policy, which
made it impossible for Germany to stimulate economic growth using monetary
policy (Carlin 2009). Stimulating the economy using scal policy was also im-
possible, because Germany was bound to the Maastricht treaty, which established
strict economic criteria on the member states of the EMU. For example, the gov-
ernment budget decit was not allowed to be more than 3 per cent of GDP (Mayes
and El-Agraa 2011). As Table 3.8 indicates, Germany had a decit of 9.5 per cent
in 1995. Shortly before the introduction of the Euro, the decit was pushed below
3 per cent:
Table 3.8: Government decit/surplus in percent to GDP, Germany
1995-1999
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
-9.5 -3.4 -2.8 -2.3 -1.6
Source: Eurostat (2012)
Decreasing the government budget decit was especially challenging because the
German welfare state had to support an increasing number of unemployed people
as Figure 3.19 has shown previously. Thus, the budget did not leave any room to
pursue strong expansionary scal policy.
1243.6.4 The wage policy
Besides the aftermaths of the reunication, weak economic growth also resulted
from a more fundamental problem. The German economy wasted huge amounts
of labour. Figure 3.19 has previously shown that unemployment over the 1990s
increased strongly and unemployment continued to rise during the early 2000s
(OECD 2012).
Why did the German economy fail to integrate so many unused resources? It has
been argued that wage policy is one of the main reasons behind high unemploy-
ment (eg. European Commission 2002; Siebert 2005). In Germany, wages are not
determined by the market, but in a sector-wide bargaining process between the
unions and the employers associations, which usually results in wages being set
nationwide (Siebert 2005). Figure 3.20 uses the example of the growth rate in
hourly earnings in the manufacturing sector to highlight that wage policy did not
lead to an appropriate development of wages:
125Figure 3.20: Growth rate of hourly earnings in manufacturing, Germany
1991-2000
Source: OECD (2012)
Figure 3.20 shows that especially during the early 1990s wages increased very
strongly. Since unemployment was increasing at the same time as previously shown
by Figure 3.19, this wage development provides evidence for a malfunctioning in
the labour market resulting from inappropriate wage policy.
Since the mid-1990s the wage policy changed. The East German states and many
small rms in West Germany left to collective wage setting agreement and started
to negotiate their own wages, often using the sectoral agreement as a point of ref-
erence. In addition, unions lost both members and in
uence over the 1990s (Burda
126and Hunt 2011; Carlin 2009). As a result, wage increases in subsequent years were
less strong (Carlin 2009). For the time span of 2001 to 2008 wages even stayed
constant (Burda and Hunt 2011).
From the mid-1990s onwards, the German industry also improved its production
processes, making more use of cheap inputs from abroad. Both the reform of
the wage setting system and improvements in the production processes increased
the competitiveness of the German economy. As a result, Germany experienced an
export boom over the following years (Carlin 2009). This even led to a fairly strong
economic growth of more than 3 per cent in 2000, as Figure 3.12 demonstrated.
3.6.5 The reform of the welfare system
Nevertheless, Germany still did not manage to achieve strong long-run economic
growth. Consequently, the German economy was outperformed by almost all
other European countries during the 1990s and early 2000s (European Commis-
sion 2002). In addition, during the early 2000s the situation on the labour market
continued to get worse, as Figure 3.21 illustrates:
127Figure 3.21: Unemployment rate, Germany 2000-2011
Source: OECD (2012)
To ght the high rate of unemployment, the Schr oder government started to im-
plement the most extensive welfare system reform in Germany's post-war history,
known as the Hartz Reform. The Hartz reform included four laws that were im-
plemented over the time period from 2003 to 2005 (Jacobi and Kluve 2006).
Before the Hartz reform the German welfare system had been very generous. It
provided unemployment payments which were sucient to maintain the recipi-
ents' social status, because they were linked to his or her previous earnings. The
Hartz reform excluded low skilled labour from generous unemployment payments
128and only provides them with support to cover their basic living expenses (Carlin
2009). The intention behind this was to induce unemployed people to accept jobs
that they would normally not want to do. Another part of the Hartz reform was
the reformulation of the rights and duties of the unemployed by revising the legal
and constitutional framework. Recipients of welfare payments are now forced to
apply to a certain amount of jobs per month and they can lose their welfare pay-
ments if they do not accept a job oer (Jacobi and Kluve 2006). Other measures of
the reform included changes in the regulation of the labour market and measures
that were aiming to increase the eciency of employment service agencies (Jacobi
and Kluve 2006).
As shown by Figure 3.18, RGDP and employment started to increase strongly from
2003 onwards. In addition, the unemployment rate started to decrease signicantly
from 2005 onwards as illustrated by Figure 3.21. The Hartz reform was considered
to be a a great success.
3.6.6 The global nancial crisis
In 2009, Germany was hit rmly by the global nancial crisis and fell into its deep-
est recession of its post-war history (Maddison 1991; OECD 2012). The immense
collapse of the economy was mainly due to the severe decline in world trade, which
129aected the on exports relying German economy especially strong. However, in
contrast to other economies, eg. the US economy, employment in Germany did
not decrease much during the global nancial crisis (Burda and Hunt 2011).
Burda and Hunt (2011) identied a couple of reasons for this. First, Burda and
Hunt (2011) estimated that employers hired less than expected during the pre-
ceding boom period. In addition the use of working time accounts played a role.
During the crisis a lot of workers only worked short hours (Burda and Hunt 2011).
Therefore, less employment reductions were necessary. As indicated by Figure 3.12
the German economy recovered soon after the crisis and experienced strong eco-
nomic growth over the two following years.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter provided details about Germany's political and economic develop-
ment. It was shown that West Germany's early economic development was sup-
ported by the Cold War (Marshall Plan, mass immigration into West Germany)
and the Korea War (high demand for German production goods). This led to
a period of high economic growth during the 1950s and 1960s. As such, West
Germany's turned into a wealthy and prosperous country just within two decades
after a destructive war.
130Growth slowed down over the period from 1971 to 1990 as West Germany was hit
by two oil crises and its catch-up bonus disappeared. Economic growth rates were
still moderately strong but unemployment started to increase. The reunication
in 1990 brought further challenges, because East Germany was relatively poor
and its enterprises were not used to compete on the world market. This and a
couple of other problems led to a poor economic performance of Germany after
the reunication. The rising unemployment and the weak economic growth led
to an extensive reform of the welfare state in the mid-2000s. After this reform
economic growth accelerated and unemployment started to decrease.
131Chapter 4: Empirical Analysis
4.1 Introduction
This chapter provides the empirical analysis of the growth models which were
introduced in Chapter 2. Section 4.2 provides details on the data sources and any
necessary data manipulation. Then the dierent growth models are estimated in
the following sections. It is started with the application of Solow (1956) - Swan
(1956) growth framework which is found in Section 4.3. The application of the
Kaldor (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962; Kaldor 1966) model is found in
Section 4.4 and the one of the Romer (1986) model is provided in Section 4.5.
4.2 Data
All growth models require values for output, capital input and labour input. In
addition, the estimation of the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) model requires an es-
timate for income shares. For the estimation of the Kaldor (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor
132and Mirrlees 1962; Kaldor 1966) model data on the real output of the manufactur-
ing sector and the employment in the manufacturing sector are needed. Lastly, the
Romer (1986) model requires data which can serve as a proxy for knowledge. This
thesis experiments with the number of patents, the research and development
expenditure and the number of research and development personnel as possible
proxies.
4.2.1 Output
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has been chosen as the proxy for output.
This diers to Solow (1957), who chose Gross National Product (GNP) as the
proxy for output in his paper, but it is in accordance with recent in
uential papers
like Young (1994); Mankiw et al. (1992); Barro (1991). The GDP measures the
estimated value of all goods and services produced within a country in a given
year. In contrast, the GNP measure the estimated value of all goods and services
produced by citizens of a country within this country or abroad. Therefore, the
GDP is regarded as a more suitable choice for the aims of this thesis, as it attempts
to analyse the economic growth of the German economy. Values for the GDP have
been obtained from the OECD (2012). In particular, the Gross Domestic Product,
national currency, constant prices, OECD base year, millions was taken. There-
fore, the GDP values were in Euro and they were already adjusted to prices of 2005
133(which is the OECD base year), making an adjustment for in
ation unnecessary.
4.2.2 Capital
4.2.2.1 Period 1970 - 1990
Next, the values for capital are required and this turned out to be a little bit more
complicated. The best proxy for capital is the net capital stock, because it is a
measurement of the total capital which is available for production. For the period
from 1970 to 1990 the Gross Capital Stock in prices of 2000 ( ^ Kt) was obtained
from Statistische  Amter des Bundes und der L ander (2006). These values required
a few renements, which are described in the following. The dierent steps can be
followed by looking at Table Appendix B.1.
First of all, the obtained gross capital stock values have to be transformed into the
same price level as the GDP values, which are in 2005 prices. Therefore, in
ation
rates it for the time period from 1970 to 2005 were obtained from the OECD
(2012). Using these in
ation rates, an in
ation index ^ Pt with ^ P2000 = 1:00 was
created using the following formula:
^ Pt 1 =
^ Pt
1 + it
(4.1)
134Using the 2000-in
ation index, the gross capital stock was transformed to current
prices through multiplication with the 2000-in
ation index:
K

t = ^ Kt  ^ Pt (4.2)
Next, another price index, P2005 = 1:00 was created using the same formula as
above. Using the new price index the gross capital stock in current prices is
transformed into the gross capital stock in constant prices of 2005 by dividing it
by the 2005-in
ation index:
~ Kt =
K
t
Pt
(4.3)
The nal step is to transform the gross capital stock into the net capital stock.
Therefore, it has to be adjusted for depreciation. The literature suggests a depre-
ciation rate of 3 percent (eg. Romer 1989; Nehru and Dhareshwar 1993). Unfor-
tunately, actual numbers for the net capital stock cannot be calculated, because
the net capital stock of 1969 is unknown. Therefore, the net capital stock of 1970
is dened as K1970 = 100. Then, the change rate of the gross capital stock is
calculated and depreciation is subtracted in order to derive the change of the net
capital stock:
_ Kt =
~ Kt+1   ~ Kt
~ Kt
  0:03 (4.4)
135Accordingly, the relative values of the net capital stock are calculated as:
Kt = Kt 1  _ Kt (4.5)
The results are shown in Table Appendix B.1.
4.2.2.2 Period 1991 - 2011
Values of the gross capital stock from 1991 to 2008 were obtained from the same
source as the values of the previous period (Statistische  Amter des Bundes und der
L ander 2010). For the years up until 2008, the same transformations as outlined
above were performed. In regards to the creation of the two price indexes, for any
years greater than the base year, the following equation has to be applied:
Pt = Pt 1  (1 + it) (4.6)
The results for the transformation of the gross capital stock in 2000 prices into the
net capital stock in 2005 prices are shown in Table Appendix B.2. It is important
to note that K1991 was dened to equal 100, and therefore the values of the net
capital stock of this period cannot be compared with those of the previous period.
As this data source did not provide values for the gross capital stock for the years
1362009 - 2011, these values were estimated. To do that, the Gross xed capital
formation, national currency, constant prices, OECD base year, millions (It) for
these years was extracted from OECD (2012) as a proxy for investments. These
values were added to the gross capital stock:
~ Kt = ~ Kt 1 + It (4.7)
The obtained values were used to calculate _ Kt and Kt applying the equation out-
lined above. The results can be seen in Table Appendix B.3. Unfortunately, these
estimations are not satisfying, because net capital stock growth jumps from  0:991
percent in 2008 to 0.698 per cent in 2009. As it is quite unrealistic that the capi-
tal stock suddenly started to increase so sharply during the nancial crisis, these
estimates are not considered to be accurate and will therefore not be used.
As such, another approach is tested. The gross capital stock in current prices for
the years 2009 to 2011 is estimated using the average change rate of the three
previous years. Accordingly:
_ K

t = K

(t 1)  (
_ K
(t 1) + _ K
(t 2) + _ K
(t 3)
3
+ 1) (4.8)
These estimates are transformed into the net capital stock using the exact same
137method as outlined above. Table Appendix B.4 illustrates the results. Again,
these estimates are somewhat problematic, because they advocate an increasingly
strong decline in capital stock for 2010 and 2011. While it would be realistic that
because of the global nancial crisis the German capital stock decreased strongly
in 2009, reasons for an increasingly strong decline for the years of 2010 and 2011
were not found in the analysis conducted in the previous chapter. Thus, these
estimations are rejected as well.
The third approach is simply to calculate the average change in the net capital
stock change rate of the three previous years and to estimate the net capital stock
for 2009 to 2011 using these rates:
_ Kt =
_ K(t 1)   _ K(t 2)   _ K(t 3)
3
(4.9)
The results are shown in Table Appendix B.5. While they are not perfect, these
estimates are considered to be the best ones because they are in line with the
change rates of the previous periods. There surely is a concern whether the net
capital stock estimates are a little bit too high, because the actual net capital stock
in 2009 probably decreased more strongly as a result of the global nancial crisis.
Nevertheless, this method delivered the most realistic estimates as compared to
the other methods. Hence these estimates are used to analyse Germany's economic
138growth.
4.2.3 Labour
Total employment in persons is used as a proxy for labour as it captures the size of
the labour stock. This number was also obtained from the OECD (2012). Using
total employment as a proxy for labour has its limitations, because it does not
distinguish between part-time and full-time work. Nevertheless, for the aims of
this thesis using total employment in persons is sucient, because the derivation
of other measures like total working hours is very time consuming and complex
for the limited amount of time and resources to complete this thesis.
4.2.4 Factor shares
To estimate the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) model, estimates for the factor shares
are required. Actually it is enough if either a value for the capital share  or the
labour share  is obtained, because under the assumption of constant returns to
scale the sum of  and  equals one. Thus, if one value is obtained, the other one
can be calculated by subtracting the obtained value with one (1    or 1   ).
A recent in
uential paper on the estimation of the labour share is Gollin (2002).
Gollin (2002) challenged the traditional method of estimating the labour share
139by arguing that this method leads to an underestimation of the labour income
of small rms. Gollin (2002) provides three dierent techniques which correct
for this error. The correction of an underestimation of labour income of small
rms makes Gollin's (2002) methods particularly interesting for an analysis of
Germany's economy, because small and medium-sized enterprises make up a high
share of Germany's economy (European Commission 2011). In addition, Gollin's
(2002) factor share estimates are remarkably constant over time. Constant factor
shares is something that economic theory has often suggested, but traditional fac-
tor share estimation methods did not conrm (Gollin 2002).
While Gollin (2002) himself did not use his approach to calculate Germany's labour
share, this was done by Bernanke and G urkaynak (2002). Their calculations are
based on average data from 1980 to 1995. For West Germany they apply two
of the three techniques put forward in Gollin (2002) and they arrive at a labour
share of 0.69 or 0.71 (implying a capital share of 0.31 or 0.29), while the traditional
method yields a labour share of 0.63 (implying a capital share of 0.37) (Bernanke
and G urkaynak 2002).
Other in
uential papers on factor shares include Christensen et al. (1980) and
Dougherty (1991). Christensen et al. (1980) provide yearly estimates of Germany's
140capital shares for the time period from 1950 to 1973. The average of these esti-
mations has been reported to be 0.39 (Maddison 1987); with the lowest estimate
being 0.34 in 1950 and the highest one being 0.43 in 1968 (Christensen et al.
1980). Dougherty (1991) reports Germany's capital share to be 0.40 during the
time period from 1960-90. These estimations are higher than the ones derived by
Bernanke and G urkaynak (2002), but they are quite close to the one Bernanke and
G urkaynak derived by using the traditional method.
As the new estimation techniques of Gollin (2002) oers some improvement over
the traditional approaches used in other papers, this paper will use 0.30 as a
capital share. This is the average of the two estimates obtained by Bernanke and
G urkaynak (2002) and it is also the value which was suggested by Maddison (1987).
4.2.5 Other data
Additional data was required for the estimations of the Kaldor (Kaldor 1957;
Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962; Kaldor 1966) and the Romer (1986) model. The
Gross Value added of the Manufacturing sector, national currency, constant prices,
OECD base year, millions is used as a proxy for manufacturing output and was
obtained from the OECD (2012). In addition, total employment in the manu-
facturing sector serves as a proxy for manufacturing labour. These values were
141taken from the International Labour Organization Department of Statistics (2012).
Since only values until 2008 are published, the values for the three following years
were estimated using the average growth rate of the three previous years (moving
average).
For the estimation of the Romer (1986) model a proxy of knowledge is required.
Romer (1986) did not specify which statistic could serve as a proxy. Therefore,
this thesis will experiment with the number of patent grants of the German Patent
Oce, which were extracted from the World Intellectual Property Organiztion
(2012). In addition, it will test the total gross domestic expenditure on Research
and Development, national currency, constant prices, OECD base year and the
amount of total Research and Development personnel, which were both obtained
from the OECD (2012).
4.2.6 Deriving the change rates
Using the raw numbers to derive the percentage change rate is quite simple. The
following equation is used:
_ Xt =
Xt   Xt 1
Xt 1
; (4.10)
where X can be substituted by any factor.
1424.3 Application of the Solow-Swan model
This section provides the estimation of the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) model.
The Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) model can be used to trace economic growth to
its factors of production, capital and labour and to technological progress (TFP
growth). Therefore, researchers can learn what drives the economic growth of a
country. In the following, this analysis will be applied to Germany.
4.3.1 Literature Review
Before applying the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) framework, this section takes a
brief look at previous TFP studies which included Germany. A famous paper is
Young (1994), who applies the Solow-Swan framework to a wide range of countries.
For the time period from 1970 to 1985 Young (1994) estimates the West German
TFP growth to be 0.9 per cent on average, ranking it 43rd of his 118 sample
countries in terms of TFP growth as shown by Table 4.1:
143Table 4.1: Young's (1994) estimation of annual TFP growth of selected
countries, 1970-1985
1. Egypt 3.5 23. Guinea 1.4 45. Turkey 0.8
2. Pakistan 3.0 24. South Korea 1.4 46. Netherlands 0.8
3. Botswana 2.9 25. Iran 1.4 47. Ethiopia 0.7
4. Congo 2.8 26. Burma 1.4 48. Austria 0.7
5. Malta 2.6 27. Mauritius 1.4 49. Australia 0.7
6. Hong Kong 2.5 28. China 1.3 50. Spain 0.6
7. Syria 2.5 29. Denmark 1.3 51. Kenya 0.6
8. Zimbabwe 2.4 30. Israel 1.2 52. France 0.5
9. Gabon 2.4 31. Greece 1.2 53. Liberia 0.4
10. Tunisia 2.4 32. Japan 1.2 54. Paraguay 0.4
11. Cameroon 2.4 33. Luxembourg 1.2 55. Honduras 0.4
12. Lesotho 2.2 34. Yugoslavia 1.1 56. Portugal 0.4
13. Uganda 2.1 35. Tanzania 1.1 57. USA 0.4
14. Cyprus 2.1 36. Colombia 1.1 58. Belgium 0.4
15. Thailand 1.9 37. Sweden 1.0 59. Canada 0.3
16. Bangladesh 1.9 38. Malaysia 1.0 60. Algeria 0.3
17. Iceland 1.8 39. Malawi 1.0 61. Cent. Af. Rep 0.2
18. Italy 1.8 40. Brazil 1.0 62. India 0.1
19. Norway 1.7 41. Panama 0.9 63. Singapore 0.1
20. Finland 1.5 42. United Kingdom 0.9 64. Sri Lanka 0.1
21. Taiwan 1.5 43. West Germany 0.9 65. Fiji 0.1
22. Ecuador 1.4 44. Mali 0.8 66. Switzerland 0.0
Source: Young (1994), p. 970
Notes: Young (1994) only ranked the top 66 countries out of the 118 countries which
were examined in his study.
However, Young's (1994) approach of measuring the capital stock diers substan-
tially to the one pursued in this thesis. Young (1994) estimated the capital stock
by accumulating investments from the previous ten years and he employed a de-
preciation rate of 6 per cent. Therefore, Young's (1994) capital stock values are
144dierent to the one used in this paper and hence it is expected that the TFP
estimations derived in this thesis are substantially dierent to the ones of Young
(1994).
Another study is Burda and Hunt (2001). Burda and Hunt (2001) estimated Ger-
many's TFP growth after the reunication. For the years from 1992 to 1995 and
from 1995 to 1999 Burda and Hunt (2001) found the TFP growth to be 0.9 per
cent respectively (Burda and Hunt 2001).
The last study to be mentioned is European Commission (2002). The European
Commission (2002) found Germany's TFP growth to be 1.2 per cent from 1971
to 2000. For the period from 1991 to 2000 the European Commission (2002) esti-
mated it to be 0.9 per cent. Unfortunately, the European Commission (2002) did
not provide any details on their calculation and it cannot be understood how they
estimated Germany's capital stock or which capital share they used.
The mentioned studies dier in the sample period, but they arrive at very similar
TFP growth estimates. Lastly, it should be noted that at the beginning of the 1990s
the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) growth framework was often applied to analyse
the remarkably high economic growth rates of East Asian countries. In a famous
145article in the magazine Foreign Aairs Krugman (1994) introduced these studies
to the general public. Krugman (1994) pointed out that these papers reported
that only little growth came from technological progress and most growth came
from factor accumulation. Krugman (1994) argued that without technological
progress the production function does not shift upwards and therefore economies
with low TFP growth will move towards the steady state level. This implies that
growth rates will fall as they will experience diminishing marginal productivity of
capital and labour by moving to the steady state level. As such, Krugman (1994)
concluded that economic growth which is purely based on factor accumulation is
not sustainable. Constant technological progress on the other hand ensures that
the economy is far away from the point of steady state and thus the economy's
growth is sustainable (Krugman 1994). Following Krugman's (1994) analysis and
observation, this thesis will also evaluate whether Germany's economic growth
rates are sustainable.
4.3.2 Methodology
This section describes the methodology which will be applied to estimate the TFP
growth rates. First, using the Cobb-Douglas production function, the Solow (1956)
- Swan (1956) model can be written as:
Yt = AtK

t L
1 
t (4.11)
146where At denotes the stance of technology, Kt is capital, Lt is labour and  is the
capital share. Using change rates this function can be rewritten as:
_ Yt = _ At +   _ Kt + (1   )  _ Lt (4.12)
Thus, the rate of economic growth equals the rate of technological progress plus
the capital share times the change in the capital stock plus the labour share times
the change in the labour stock. In the above equation, there is only one unknown
variable, which is _ At. Accordingly, the above equation can be rewritten as:
_ At = _ Yt     _ Kt   (1   )  _ Lt (4.13)
Substituting growth rates into the right hand side of the above equation will yield
an estimate for the TFP growth, _ At. The next section estimates _ At for the time
period 1971 to 1990.
4.3.3 TFP Estimation 1: Period 1971 to 1990, West Ger-
many
Table 4.2 shows the results of the estimations for the rst time period:
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148The rst three columns show the raw data which was used for the estimations.
After transforming these values into the change rates which are shown in columns
four to six, columns seven to nine are calculated using the approach outlined in
Equation 4.13.
The last row of Table 4.2 gives the average values for the time period. It can be
seen that West Germany economy grew by 2.61 per cent on average and that TFP
growth was 2.18 per cent on average during this time period. Therefore, roughly
four fths of West Germany's economic growth was coming from technological
progress. Factor accumulation only plays a minor role, with labour accumulation
contributing 0.34 per cent and capital accumulation contributing 0.10 per cent.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the results of Table 4.2 graphically:
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150Figure 4.1 and Table 4.2 show that over the sample period of 1971 to 1990, tech-
nological progress was always positive, but it was very volatile. For example, in
1975 TFP growth was 0.79 per cent and one year later it was 5.17 per cent. Tech-
nological progress was the main driver of economic growth for most years. Only
in 1980, 1986, 1987 and 1990 labour accumulation contributed more strongly to
economic growth.
The strongest rate of technological progress was achieved in 1976, where techno-
logical progress was 5.17 per cent, leading to economic growth of 4.95 per cent as
factor accumulation was negative. Over the time period of 1971 to 1990, there
were actually several years where factor accumulation was negative, but the West
German economy still managed to grow because technological progress was so
strong. Figure 4.1 also shows a strong correlation between RGDP growth and
TFP growth, but this will be analysed in the Real Business Cycle section below
in detail.
Table 4.3 breaks Table 4.2 down into four periods of ve year time intervals:
151Table 4.3: Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) estimation decomposed into ve
year average growth rates, West Germany 1971-1990
RGDP growth Capital Share Labour Share TFP growth
1971-1975 2.42% 0.51% -0.29% 2.22%
1976-1980 3.37% 0.14% 0.50% 2.71%
1981-1985 1.36% -0.09% -0.35% 1.80%
1986-1990 3.30% -0.17% 1.49% 1.98%
As shown by Table 4.3, with growth rates being greater than 3 per cent economic
growth was very strong during two of these four periods. In the rst period,
economic growth was decent and in the third period it was fairly weak. Look-
ing at the second column with the contribution of the capital stock to economic
growth a trend is noticeable. During all four periods, the contribution of capital
accumulation to economic growth declined. This is especially interesting because
in the period from 1986-1990, which was the period with the second strongest
output growth, capital contribution was the lowest. Labour accumulation and
TFP growth, in contrast, do not show a clear trend. Labour accumulation was
positive and negative in two time periods respectively. It is noticeable that the
labour contribution to economic growth was pretty strong in the last period, but
referring to Table 4.2 it can be seen that this was mainly the in
uence of the
last year of the sample period. As the previous chapter pointed out, immigration
to West Germany was very high in 1990, because of the downfall of the Wall in
1521989. The TFP growth rates showed little variation when calculated as ve year
averages. During the period of 1976-1980 the rate of technological progress was
the highest with 2.71 per cent and during the period of 1981-1985 it was the lowest.
With so little economic growth coming from factor accumulation and with constant
and strong technological growth, which shifted the production function upwards
over many years, the West German economy must have been far away from the
steady state (see Figure 2.2, Chapter 2, p. 19). Therefore, even if technological
progress had suddenly stopped, factor accumulation could provide strong growth
for many years before diminishing productivity would set in.
It can be concluded that West Germany's economic growth was mainly driven by
technological progress. In addition, West Germany's technological progress was
both strong and stable. It averaged over two percent during the total sample
period and it does not show a declining trend. Following the analysis of Krugman
(1994), West Germany's economic growth is very sustainable. The next section
will test the sustainability of Germany's long-run growth. If TFP is positive and
signicant in the period 1971-1990, it must have some positive impacts to the
forthcoming years. In other words, the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) residuals can
have a positive impact on output growth in the coming years.
1534.3.4 TFP Estimation 2: Period 1992 to 2011, Germany
This section provides the application of the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) growth
framework to the German economic growth experience after the reunication. Ta-
ble 4.4 provides the results:
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155Looking at the average values, which are given in the last row of Table 4.4, it can
be seen that the performance was weaker than in the previous period. Average
economic growth was 1.33 per cent and average TFP growth was 1.48 per cent.
The implication of TFP growth being higher than RGDP growth is that factor
accumulation must have been negative. And in fact, the results show that the
declining capital stock led to capital accumulation contributing negative 0.26 per
cent to economic growth and labour accumulation contributed only 0.11 per cent.
Table 4.5 compares the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) estimation results of both time
periods and thus provides some insights on why Germany grew less strongly during
the second period than during the rst one.
Table 4.5: Comparison of the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) estimation
results of both time period, West Germany 1971-1990 and Germany
1991-2011
RGDP growth Capital Share Labour Share TFP growth
1971-1990 2.61% 0.10% 0.34% 2.18%
1992-2011 1.33% -0.26% 0.11% 1.48%
Dierence 1.28% 0.36% 0.23% 0.70%
As shown, the rst period dominated the second one in all three aspects that
contribute to economic growth. During the rst period, capital accumulation con-
tributed 0.36 per cent, labour accumulation 0.23 per cent and TFP growth 0.70
per cent more to economic growth than during the second one. This indicates that
156the reunited Germany was signicantly less innovative than West Germany. It
was also not able to accumulate capital or labour at the rates that West Germany
managed to achieve.
It is possible that the decline in TFP growth as compared to the 1971-1990 period
can be explained by the decline in capital investment, as suggested by Kaldor and
Mirrlees (1962). The importance of capital investments will be tested empirically
in the forthcoming sections.
Nevertheless, the results of Table 4.4 also have good implications. Over this time
period economic growth was completely driven by technological progress. With the
capital stock decreasing and the labour stock increasing only modestly, Germany
was still able to increase its total output by almost one third. Like for the previous
period, Figure 4.2 indicates that technological progress contributed the highest
share to economic progress in most years:
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158However, unlike in the period before, Germany experienced two years of techno-
logical regress. The rst time was during the recession in 1993 and second time
was during the global nancial crisis in 2009. Figure 4.2 also shows that from 2004
until the global nancial crisis, labour accumulation contributed a high share to
economic growth. This development falls together with the reform of the welfare
state, which was outlined in the previous chapter and which had the goal to acti-
vate the low-skilled labour force. After a decline in TFP in 2009, which resulted
from the global nancial crisis, TFP growth in the two years that followed was
very strong. As for the period before, Figure 4.2 indicates that there is a strong
correlation between RGDP and technological growth.
Table 4.6 decomposes the estimation results into ve year average growth rates:
Table 4.6: Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) estimation decomposed into ve
year average growth rates, Germany 1992-2011
RGDP growth Capital Share Labour Share TFP growth
1992-1996 1.16% -0.07% -0.50% 1.74%
1997-2001 2.00% -0.23% 0.21% 2.02%
2002-2006 1.02% -0.43% 0.23% 1.23%
2006-2011 1.13% -0.33% 0.52% 0.94%
As shown by Table 4.6, economic growth was the strongest during the 1997-2001
period, during which Germany experienced an export boom as discussed in the
159previous chapter. The other three time periods highlight almost identical eco-
nomic growth rates. The contribution of capital accumulation was declining over
the rst three periods and was negative four all four periods. In the fourth period
the decrease was less strong, but it has to be kept in mind that the quality of
the net capital stock estimates for the years 2009 to 2011 may not be that good.
Economic growth coming from labour accumulation shows an increasing trend.
After the rst years following the reunication, labour accumulation contributed
negative economic growth but during the following three periods it was positive.
Looking at the decomposition of TFP growth rates into four periods shows the
that during the two periods after reunication technological progress was stronger
than it had been in the two most recent periods. Even though TFP growth in
the two most recent periods was still reasonably high, a further decline over sub-
sequent periods would be alarming.
In regards to the analysis of Krugman (1994) it can be said that Germany is still far
away from the steady state, because of the decent technological progress and the
weak factor accumulation during the 1990s. Nevertheless, the weaker TFP growth
of the 2000s raises concerns that Germany may have to increase its factor accumu-
lation to sustain short-run economic growth. However, it has to be kept in mind
that the low TFP growth during the fourth period is strongly biased by the steep
160technological regression resulting from the global nancial crisis. Accordingly, one
has to await the development over the following years before a conclusion on the
trend of TFP growth rates can be made.
In conclusion, economic growth after the reunication was substantially weaker
than before. Most of this decline can be accredited to weaker technological progress,
but factor accumulation, especially capital, was also weaker. Technological growth
was the driver of economic growth with factor accumulation contributing negative
economic growth during the sample period. There are some concerns about TFP
growth to decline further, but this impression could also be biased by the severe
and extraordinary eects on technological growth by the global nancial crisis.
The next section analyses the relationship between TFP and aggregate output
growth based on the RBC. In doing so, the analysis found in this thesis will be
more complete.
4.3.5 Estimation of the Real Business Cycle Theory
Figure 4.1 and 4.2 gave the impression that there is a strong correlation between
technological progress and real GDP growth. This is also one of the main the-
ses of the Real Business Cycle theory, which was brie
y introduced in the second
161chapter of this thesis. The Real Business Cycle theory applies the Solow (1956) -
Swan (1956) framework in order to estimate technological 
uctuations, which are
believed to be the driver of business cycles. This section will test the relationship
between output growth and technological progress using the auto regressive error
specication.
In testing the real business cycle theory, the following equation is estimated:
_ Y =  +  _ A + ut; (4.14)
where  denotes the coecient, which is expected to be greater than zero,  de-
notes the constant, _ Y is the change rate in output, _ A is the TFP change rate and
ut is the error term, where for AR(1) ut = put 1 + t, t  N(0;2
), t = 1;2;:::;n
(Taylor 2007, p. 149) and for AR(2)1 ut = p1ut 1 + p2ut 2 + t, t  N(0;2),
t = 1;2;:::;n (Taylor 2007, p. 133).
Equation 4.14 is used to estimate the gap between RGDP and TFP growth. Real
Business Cycle theory suggests that this gap is very small, because both variables
1u1 and u2 are normally distributed in the AR(2) process. They both have zero means and a
constant variance:
V (u1) = V (u2) = 2
(1   p2)=(1 + p2)3   p2
1(1 + p2) (4.15)
Cov(u1;u2) = 2
p1=(1 + p2)3   p2
1(1 + p2) (4.16)
(Taylor 2007, p. 142)
162move together. The coecients will be estimated using the auto regressive er-
ror specication, which is more robust than the standard OLS approach for the
estimation of time series data (Taylor 2007).
4.3.5.1 RBC Estimation 1: 1971-1990
Table 4.7 illustrates the results for the rst estimation:
Table 4.7: Estimation of the Real Business Cycle theory, West Germany
1971-1990
1. AR(1) Inverse Interpolation Method Converged after 7 iterations
Constant () Coecient () R-Bar2 DW
-0.09 1.09 [0.000] 0.71 1.08
(0.16) (0.15)
2. Exact AR(2) Newton-Raphson Iterative Method converged after 6 iterations
Constant () Coecient () R-Bar2 DW
-0.13 1.14 [0.000] 0.78 1.49
(0.13) (0.12)
Notes: Signicant at 5 per cent level. P-value in square brackets. Standard error in parenthesis.
Durbin-Watson d Statistic: Signicance points of dl and du at 5 per cent signicance level:
dl = 1:20 and du = 1:41 (Gujarati and Porter 2010).
As Table 4.7 shows, both the AR(1) and the AR(2) method were tested. The
results of the AR(1) estimation did not turn out to be statistically robust, because
the Durbin-Watson statistic has a value of 1.08, which is below dl. Therefore, there
is evidence of positive rst-order serial correlation meaning that the estimations
163are not reliable (Gujarati and Porter 2010).
The AR(2) method, on the other hand, provides reliable estimations, as the
Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic was found to be above 1.41 and below 2.00, in-
dicating that there is no evidence of positive rst-order serial correlation (Gujarati
and Porter 2010). The coecient of _ A, C2 is estimated to be 1.14. This means that
when TFP increases by one per cent, then RGDP increases by 1.14 per cent. The
value of 0.78 for R-Bar2 indicates that 78 per cent of the movements of RGDP can
be explained by the movements of TFP. This is a fairly strong correlation. Thus
it can be concluded that 
uctuations in TFP do aect RGDP, which is consistent
with the RBC analysis.
4.3.5.2 RBC Estimation 2: 1992-2011
The estimation for the second period is shown in Table 4.8:
Table 4.8: Estimation of the Real Business Cycle theory, Germany1992-
2011
Exact AR(1) Inverse Interpolation Method Converged after 5 iterations
Constant () Coecient () R-Bar2 DW
-0.07 1.06 [0.000] 0.89 1.84
(0.07) (0.07)
Notes: Signicant at 5 per cent level. P-value in square brackets. Standard error in parenthesis.
Durbin-Watson d Statistic: Signicance points of dl and du at 5 per cent signicance level:
dl = 1:20 and du = 1:41 (Gujarati and Porter 2010).
164Here, the AR(1) method provided useful results since the Durbin-Watson statis-
tic is above 1.41 and below 2.00. It can also be seen that with R-Bar2 being 89
per cent, the correlation between TFP and RGDP growth is even stronger in this
period than in the one before (RBC Estimation 1). For this time period a change
in TFP of 1 per cent leads to a change of 1.06 per cent in RGDP, which is a little
bit less than in the previous period. Therefore, the gap between RGDP and TFP
became smaller and therefore the in
uence of TFP 
uctuations in the second time
period was higher than in the rst one.
In conclusion, these estimations give supporting evidence for the Real Business
Cycle theory.
4.3.6 Policy implications
Based on the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) analysis one reason why West Germany
achieved stronger economic growth than the reunited Germany was that West
Germany's technological progress was stronger. To increase growth rates, German
policy makers should pursue measures that stimulate technological progress. As
outlined in the second chapter of this thesis, Romer (1986) suggested that techno-
logical progress is a result of knowledge accumulation. Following Romer's (1986)
analysis, German policy makers could increase research and development expendi-
165ture or provide tax cuts for companies that do research and development in order
to increase knowledge accumulation.
An alternative view is suggested by Lucas (1988). Lucas (1988) argued that techno-
logical progress is a result of improvements in human capital. Thus, policy makers
should implement measures that improve education. For example, the government
could provide more incentives for citizens to undergo further education. Another
policy to increase technological progress would be to improve the education system.
Besides having found weaker technological progress during the second time period,
the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) analysis has also highlighted that Germany's eco-
nomic growth coming from capital accumulation was weaker in the second period.
This is not surprising as the previous chapter has shown that the German capital
stock decreases in size. Thus, another measure to stimulate economic growth is
to increase investments. One possibility is by oering tax cuts or subsidies for
investments. Based on Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) increasing investments would
also lead to increases in technological progress, and as such TFP growth.
1664.3.7 Limitations
The application of the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) growth framework has some
limitations, which are outlined in the following section. The purpose of this section
is to point out that the results of the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) estimation are
highly dependent on a number of assumptions and on the quality of the data
inputs. This means that the numbers derived in this thesis can only be considered
as a point of reference.
4.3.7.1 Capital Stock
The estimation results depend strongly on the size of the net capital stock. One
crucial assumption in the derivation of the net capital stock is the depreciation rate.
Based on ndings in the literature this thesis assumed that the depreciation rate
is three per cent. Using the period from 1971-1990 as an example, Table 4.9 shows
how dierent depreciation rates lead to dierent net capital stock and Table 4.10
shows how this aects TFP growth estimates:
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169Looking at Table 4.9 rst, it can be seen that for a low depreciation rate the net
capital stock actually increases and for depreciation rates higher than three per
cent it decreases over the whole sample period. Even a dierence of only 0.5 per
cent in the depreciation rate lead to strong dierences in the estimates. In fact,
the longer the time period, the stronger are these dierences. The last row of
Table 4.10 shows the implied average TFP growth rate and the resulting share of
technological progress to total economic growth. An increase of 0.5 per cent in the
depreciation rate increases the value of the TFP estimates by 0.15 per cent and
the contribution of technological progress to total economic growth increases by
roughly six per cent. The reason behind this is that the greater the depreciation
rate, the smaller is the net capital stock. A small net capital stock implies low
capital accumulation. Therefore, more economic growth is traced to technological
progress. Thus, it can be concluded that the choice of the depreciation rate in
u-
ences the results of the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) estimation strongly.
Besides the depreciation rate there is also a more general problem surrounding
the capital stock. It is very hard to measure capital. This was rst pointed
out by economists of the University of Cambridge and has led to the Cambridge
Capital Controversy. The following quote by (Hunt 2002, p. 430) describes the
measurement problems associated with capital very well:
170"While it is perfectly clear what we mean when we aggregate the
amount of labor employed (in order to ascertain its marginal productiv-
ity), it is by no means clear what we mean when we aggregate capital.
If we say 100 laborers worked for one week, the meaning is unam-
biguous. But what does it mean to say 100 capitals worked for one
week? One hundred factories? Of various sizes? One hundred shov-
els? Fifty factories and 25 shovels and 25 oil rening plants? This is
obviously nonsensical. One piece of capital can be anything ranging
from a screwdriver to a gigantic plant that employs tens of thousand
of workers."
The quote does not only point out that the size of the capital stock is hard to
measure, it also tells that the implication of the size of the capital stock on pro-
ductivity is ambiguous. One can simply not say that two capital stocks which
have the same monetary value are equally productive. Similar, one can also not
argue that a capital stock with a higher monetary value is more productive than
a capital stock with a lower monetary value.
Despite the capital controversy, the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) analysis conducted
in this paper treats capital accumulation equally. For example, with a capital share
of 0.30 and without any changes in technology and labour, a ve percent increase
171in capital stock would lead to an increase of 1.5 per cent in economic growth. An
increase in capital stock of two per cent would lead to economic growth of 0.6
per cent. No distinction is made concerning the composition of the added capital.
Only the size of the capital stock matters. As the Capital Controversy points out
this is likely to be wrong. Therefore, the quality of the TFP estimations is aected.
4.3.7.2 Labour stock
There are not only problems concerning the capital stock but there is also at least
one that concerns the labour stock. This thesis has used the number of total
employed persons to derive the labour stock. Normally it would be preferred to
use the number of total hours worked. This is especially true for the case of Ger-
many, because there was a rapid increase in part-time employment in the 1990s
implying that the number of total employed persons overweights the actual labour
contribution (European Commission 2002). However, it was decided to use total
employment in persons, because deriving the amount of total hours worked is time
consuming and complex and therefore beyond the scope of this thesis.
Nevertheless it should be noted that because of the high share of part time work in
the German economy, the estimations in this thesis are likely to overstate the share
of labour accumulation to economic growth. This concerns especially the second
time period. Consequently, technological progress is likely to be understated.
1724.3.7.3 Factor shares
The Solow-Swan estimation has been reported to be highly sensitive to the choice of
the factor shares (Dowling and Summers 1998). Based on ndings in the literature,
this thesis used a capital share of 0.3. Table 4.11 points out how TFP estimations
would dier using other capital shares:
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174From Table 4.11 it can be seen that especially during years in which there was
a strong movement in factor accumulation, TFP estimations were very sensitive
to the choice of capital share. For example, for the year of 1975 a capital share
of 0.20 would imply TFP growth of 1.13 per cent and a capital share 0.50 would
imply a TFP growth of only 0.11 per cent. In contrast, for the year of 1990 the
trend is increasing. A capital share of 0.20 would imply TFP growth of 1.51 per
cent and a capital share of 0.50 would imply a TFP growth of 3.05 per cent.
In conclusion, besides the choice of the depreciation rate, the choice of the factor
shares also has important eects on the estimation results.
4.4 Application of the Kaldor model
The application of Kaldor's (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962; Kaldor 1966)
growth framework to Germany is of particular interest in light of the ndings in
Chapter 3 that the German capital stock has been decreasing in size, especially
during the period from 1992 to 2011. For the very same time period the applica-
tion of the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) growth framework which was conducted
in Section 4.3 has found that technological progress was signicantly lower than it
was during the time period from 1971 to 1990. The Kaldor (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor
and Mirrlees 1962; Kaldor 1966) model argues that technological progress is found
175in new capital investment. Accordingly, the lower capital investment during the
period from 1992 to 2011 could explain the lower TFP growth during that time
period.
In estimating Kaldor's (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962) economic growth
model, this thesis will closely follow the approach outlined in Taylor (2007). First,
the technical progress function of Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) will be estimated.
Then, the employment elasticity will be determined for both time periods. This is
useful in order to learn more about the capital intensity of the production (Taylor
2007). Lastly, Kaldor's (1966) three growth laws will be tested on the German
growth experience from 1992 to 2011.
4.4.1 Literature Review
An extensive search of the literature did not result in any ndings of an estimation
of the technical progress function of Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) on Germany. In
regards to Kaldor's (1966) growth propositions, Kaldor (1966) himself conducted
a study where he used a cross section of twelve countries including West Germany
to test his propositions. For the sample period of 1953-4 to 1963-4 Kaldor (1966)
found supporting evidence: First, Kaldor (1966) estimated that manufacturing
growth has a strong eect on overall economic growth. Kaldor (1966) also high-
176lighted that high economic growth rates require the growth of the manufacturing
sector to be far greater than overall output growth. Kaldor (1966) conrmed
that manufacturing output growth and manufacturing productivity growth have a
strong correlation. Lastly, Kaldor (1966) showed that overall productivity growth
and employment in the manufacturing sector is positively related.
Before testing Kaldor's (1966) three growth laws on the recent German growth
experience, the next section employs the technical progress function of Kaldor and
Mirrlees (1962) to test the relationship between technical progress and economic
growth following the approach outlined by Taylor (2007).
4.4.2 Estimation of the technical progress function of Kaldor
and Mirrlees
As the second chapter has outlined, the technical progress function of Kaldor and
Mirrlees (1962) can be specied as:
_ pt
pt
= f(
_ it
it
);
where
_ pt
pt denotes the rate of growth of productivity and f(
_ it
it) denotes a function
of the rate of growth of investment per worker (Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962). Thus,
the stronger investment, the higher technological progress.
177The technical progress function of Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) is estimated using
the following approach outlined by Taylor (2007):
log y =  +  log k + ut; (4.17)
where  is expected to be greater than zero, ut = p1ut 1 +p2ut 2 +b, y is RGDP
divided by total employment and k is capital stock divided by total employment.
Putting y and k into the log form has the handy feature that this allows regression
results to be interpreted as percentage change rates.
The estimation of Equation 4.17 did not yield statistically robust results. Both
AR(1) and AR(2) delivered estimations with  being statistically insignicant.
Therefore, Equation 4.17 was adjusted as follows:
log y =  +  log k + 
 time-trend + ut (4.18)
The inclusion of a time trend reduces autocorrelation and this led to statistically
more robust estimation results as Table 4.12 shows:
178Table 4.12: Estimation of the technical progress function of Kaldor and
Mirrlees (1962), West Germany 1971-1990 and Germany 1992-2011
1. Estimation: Period 1971-1990
Exact AR(2) Newton-Raphson Iterative Method converged after 3 iterations
Constant () Coecient
()
Time trend
(
)
R-Bar2 DW
16.06 0.44 [0.001] 0.02 [0.000] 0.99 1.91
(1.31) (0.11) (0.00)
2. Estimation: Period 1992-2011
Exact AR(1) Inverse Interpolation Method Converged after 5 iterations
Constant () Coecient
()
Time trend
(
)
R-Bar2 DW
19.11 0.68 [0.001] 0.02 [0.000] 0.94 1.77
(2.05) (0.16) (0.00)
Notes: Signicant at 5 per cent level. P-value in square brackets. Standard error in parenthesis.
Durbin-Watson d Statistic: Signicance points of dl and du at 5 per cent signicance level:
dl = 1:10 and du = 1:54 (Gujarati and Porter 2010).
As shown by Table 4.12, an increase in capital per worker contributed 0.44 to every
1 per cent increase in output per worker during the time period from 1971 to 1990.
The R-Bar2 value of 0.99 indicates that this relationship is very strong and there
are also no signs of autocorrelation. Therefore, the application of Kaldor's (Kaldor
and Mirrlees 1962; Kaldor 1966) growth model suggests that capital accumulation
was very important for West Germany's economic growth.
179The results of the estimation for the second time period indicate that the contri-
bution of capital accumulation to economic growth increased. In particular, an
increase in capital per worker contributed 0.68 to every one per cent increase in
RGDP per worker. Following Kaldor's (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962)
analysis this means that Germany's technological progress in the second period
was higher than in the rst one. Nevertheless, the relationship between RGDP
per worker and capital per worker was a little bit less strong in the second period
then in it was in the rst one as indicated by R-bar2 being 94 per cent.
Taylor (2007) pointed out that technological progress in the sense of the techno-
logical progress function of Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) does not only depend on
investment, but also on the division of capital and labour. In particular, tech-
nological progress leads to labour saving production techniques. To what extent
Germany's production techniques are labour saving can be analysed by estimating
the elasticity of employment for both time periods. If labour saving did occur then
the employment elasticity of the second period is lower. The labour elasticity is
estimated using the following equation (Taylor 2007):
log YGDP =  +  log e + ut; (4.19)
180where  is expected to be greater than zero, YGDP denotes total real GDP and
e denotes total employment. The results of the estimation are illustrated in Ta-
ble 4.13:
Table 4.13: Estimation of the labour elasticity, West Germany 1971-
1990 and Germany 1992-2011
1. Estimation: Period 1971-1990
Maximum Likelihood Estimation:Fixed Initial Values of Disturbances Error TERM: AR(1) con-
verged after 4 iterations
Constant () Coecient () R-Bar2 DW
12.46 0.92 [0.000] 0.99 1.71
(3.70) (0.21)
2. Estimation: Period 1992-2011
Maximum Likelihood Estimation:Fixed Initial Values of Disturbances Error TERM: Restricted
AR(2) converged after 5 iterations
Constant () Coecient () R-Bar2 DW
10.23 1.04 [0.010] 0.90 1.49
(2.05) (0.16)
Notes: Signicant at 5 per cent level. Signicant at 10 per cent level. P-value in square
brackets. Standard error in parenthesis. Durbin-Watson d Statistic: Signicance points of dl
and du at 5 per cent signicance level: dl = 1:20 and du = 1:41 (Gujarati and Porter 2010).
Table 4.13 shows that labour elasticity was actually slightly higher in the second
time period compared to the rst one. Nevertheless, the results conrm that the
German economy is a very capital intensive one, where labour accumulation does
not play a crucial role. In the rst time period, an increase in employment of one
181percent only led to an increase in RGDP of 0.92 per cent. For the second time
period an increase in employment would increase RGDP by 1.04 per cent. This
shows that adding labour does not have strong eects on output growth.
The higher labour elasticity in the second time period is most likely as result of the
reunication. The East German economy was not as capital intense as the West
German one and therefore the importance of labour for Germany from 1992-2011
is higher than it was for West Germany from 1971-1990.
It can be concluded that according to Kaldor's (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees
1962) model, Germany experienced stronger technological progress in the second
period than in the rst period. However, production in the rst period was slightly
more capital intense than it was compared to the second period.
4.4.3 Estimation of Kaldor's growth propositions
As outlined above Kaldor (1966) conrmed his growth propositions using a cross
section of countries including West Germany from 1953-4 to 1963-4. The following
tests his growth propositions for Germany from 1992 to 2011 using the method-
ology outlined by Taylor (2007). Unfortunately, it was not possible to extent this
analysis to West Germany because of data limitations.
1824.4.3.1 Estimation of Kaldor's rst proposition
Kaldor's (1966) rst growth proposition states that there is a strong correlation
between total output growth and output growth in the manufacturing sector. In
fact, the manufacturing sector is the engine of economic growth. Kaldor's (1966)
rst growth proposition can be tested using the following equation (Taylor 2007):
log YGDP =  +  M + u (4.20)
where  is expected to be between zero and one, YGDP refers to real GDP and M
refers to gross value added by the manufacturing sector (Taylor 2007).
The estimation results are shown in Table 4.14:
Table 4.14: Estimation of Kaldor's (1966) rst proposition, Germany
1992-2011
Exact AR(2) Newton-Raphson Iterative Method converged after 12 iterations
Constant () Coecient () R-Bar2 DW
20.84 0.28 [0.000] 0.98 1.51
(0.13) (0.13)
Notes: Signicant at 5 per cent level. P-value in square brackets. Standard error in parenthesis.
Durbin-Watson d Statistic: Signicance points of dl and du at 5 per cent signicance level:
dl = 1:20 and du = 1:41 (Gujarati and Porter 2010).
The results shown in Table 4.14 indicate a very strong correlation between total
183output growth and manufacturing output growth of 98 per cent. As the coecient
of 0.28 is signicantly below unity this means that strong economic growth rates
can only be accomplished when the growth of the manufacturing sector is signif-
icantly greater than overall economic growth. However, Taylor (2007) points out
that a further estimation is required, because the estimation results are likely to be
aected by the fact that manufacturing output is a large part of total GDP. There-
fore, a second estimation analyses the relationship between non-manufacturing
output and manufacturing output:
log GDP
 =  +  log M + u (4.21)
where  is again expected to be between zero and one and GDP  refers to real
GDP without manufacturing output. If the manufacturing output is the driver of
economic growth then the estimation of Equation 4.21 should also indicate a very
strong correlation. The results of this estimation are shown in Table 4.15:
184Table 4.15: Second estimation of Kaldor's (1966) rst proposition, Ger-
many 1992-2011
Exact AR(2) Newton-Raphson Iterative Method converged after 12 iterations
Constant () Coecient () R-Bar2 DW
25.11 0.12 [0.004] 0.98 1.59
(0.96) (0.04)
Notes: Signicant at 5 per cent level. P-value in square brackets. Standard error in parenthesis.
Durbin-Watson d Statistic: Signicance points of dl and du at 5 per cent signicance level:
dl = 1:20 and du = 1:41 (Gujarati and Porter 2010).
The results in Table 4.15 show that there is a very strong correlation of 98 per
cent between non-manufacturing output and manufacturing output. In addition,
the coecient is well below unity. This conrms the previous estimation and it
can be concluded that Kaldor's (1966) rst growth proposition is right and that
the manufacturing sector is the engine of Germany's economic growth.
4.4.3.2 Estimation of Kaldor's second proposition
Kaldor's (1966) second proposition states that the growth of labour productivity in
the manufacturing sector and the growth of manufacturing output are positively
related. In addition, the growth rate of manufacturing output is equal to the
sum of its productivity growth and its employment growth. The relationship
between manufacturing labour productivity and the manufacturing output growth
185is analysed with the following equation (Taylor 2007):
log p =  +  M + u (4.22)
where  is expected to be greater than zero and P equals manufacturing output
divided by employment in the manufacturing sector. The results in Table 4.16
conrm the positive relation between growth of labour productivity and manufac-
turing output:
Table 4.16: Estimation of Kaldor's (1966) second proposition, Germany
1992-2011
Exact AR(2) Newton-Raphson Iterative Method converged after 15 iterations
Constant () Coecient () R-Bar2 DW
-12.94 0.88 [0.000] 0.99 1.59
(1.19) (0.04)
Notes: Signicant at 5 per cent level. P-value in square brackets. Standard error in parenthesis.
Durbin-Watson d Statistic: Signicance points of dl and du at 5 per cent signicance level:
dl = 1:20 and du = 1:41 (Gujarati and Porter 2010).
The R-Bar2 of 99 per cent indicates that the correlation is very strong. To test
whether the growth rate of manufacturing output is equal to the sum of its pro-
ductivity growth and its employment growth a second estimation is conducted.
log em =  +  log M + u (4.23)
186where  is expected to be greater than zero. The above equation shows that
the estimation regresses total employment in the manufacturing sector on the
manufacturing output growth. The results are illustrated in Table 4.17:
Table 4.17: Second estimation of Kaldor's (1966) second proposition,
Germany 1992-2011
Exact AR(2) Newton-Raphson Iterative Method converged after 15 iterations
Constant () Coecient () R-Bar2 DW
12.93 0.12 [0.018] 0.95 1.59
(1.19) (0.04)
Notes: Signicant at 5 per cent level. P-value in square brackets. Standard error in parenthesis.
Durbin-Watson d Statistic: Signicance points of dl and du at 5 per cent signicance level:
dl = 1:20 and du = 1:41 (Gujarati and Porter 2010).
Looking at both Table 4.16 and 4.17 is can be seen that the constants of Equa-
tions 4.22 and 4.23 do almost add up to zero. The constant of the former equation
is -12.94 and the one of the later is 12.93. In addition the coecients are 0.88
and 0.12, which adds up to one. This means that a one per cent increase in
manufacturing output would result in a 0.88 per cent increase in productivity in
manufacturing labour and a 0.12 per cent increase in employment. Nevertheless,
Kaldor's (1966) second proposition has to be rejected, because as indicated by
Table 4.17 the coecient of the second estimation is statistically not signicant
and therefore the estimates are not reliable. In conclusion, the second proposition
is rejected.
1874.4.3.3 Estimation of Kaldor's third proposition
The third proposition states that productivity growth of the total economy is
positively correlated with employment growth in the manufacturing sector and
negatively correlated with growth in the non-manufacturing sector. This can be
estimated in the following way (Taylor 2007):
log pGDP =  +  log em + 
 log enm + u (4.24)
where  is expected to be greater than zero and 
 is expected to be smaller than
zero, p denotes real GDP divided by total employment and enm is the employment
in the non-manufacturing sector. The estimation of the third proposition was not
successful, because the coecient were statistically not signicant as shown by
Table 4.18:
Table 4.18: Estimation of Kaldor's (1966) third proposition, Germany
1992-2011
Exact AR(1) Inverse Interpolation Method Converged after 7 iterations
Constant () Coecient
()
Coecient
(
)
R-Bar2 DW
3.55 -0.22 [0.191] 0.64 [0.072] 0.88 1.59
(7.52) (0.16) (0.33)
Notes: Signicant at 5 per cent level. P-value in square brackets. Standard error in parenthesis.
Durbin-Watson d Statistic: Signicance points of dl and du at 5 per cent signicance level:
dl = 1:10 and du = 1:54 (Gujarati and Porter 2010).
188Applying the AR(2) method or including a time-trend did also not yield in usable
regression results. Even though the estimates in Table 4.18 cannot be trusted
it should still be noted that the coecients also have the opposite signs of what
Kaldor (1966) predicted. In conclusion Kaldor's (1966) third growth proposition
is also rejected.
4.4.4 Policy implications
Based on Kaldor's (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962; Kaldor 1966) anal-
ysis, a large proportion of Germany's economic growth is the result of capital
accumulation. Therefore, economic growth can be increased by increasing capital
investments. As suggested previously investments can be increased by oering tax
cuts or subsidies for investments.
The ndings of this chapter have also pointed out that the manufacturing sector,
with its possibilities for increasing returns to scale, is the driver of German eco-
nomic growth. But Chapter 3 has shown that especially during the second time
period the growth of the industry sector, which comprises the manufacturing sec-
tor, was very weak. Accordingly, the German government should pursue policies
that support growth of the manufacturing sector. Here, policy makers can choose
from a wide range of policy measures, e.g. decreasing regulation or providing
189incentives for improving machinery. Following the logic put forward by Kaldor
(1966), promoting the growth of the manufacturing sector would lead to stronger
growth of the overall economy.
4.4.5 Limitations
The applicability of the Kaldor (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962; Kaldor
1966) model has several limitations. First of all, the same issues as for the Solow
(1956) - Swan (1956) model apply in terms of data input.
A crucial limitation of the Kaldor (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962; Kaldor
1966) growth model itself is that it is not as applicable as for example the Solow
(1956) - Swan (1956) model. While it is possible to estimate the technical progress
function of Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) using econometric methods, this estimation
only sheds light into the role of capital accumulation, but it does not explain the
contribution of other factors. The applicability of Kaldor's (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor
and Mirrlees 1962; Kaldor 1966) model would be much greater if it was possi-
ble to put it into a production function, like it is possible for the Solow (1956) -
Swan (1956) model. It was suggested to Kaldor to express his model using the
Cobb-Douglas production function as Y = AeatK. However, Kaldor rejected this
suggestion (Hahn 1989). Its inability to be expressed in a production function
190may also explain why the Kaldor (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962; Kaldor
1966) model is so rarely applied.
Besides the inability to be expressed as a production function, the Kaldor (Kaldor
1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962; Kaldor 1966) model also suers from general theo-
retical weaknesses. Rothschild (1959) for example has pointed out that the Kaldor
(1957) model is based on many assumptions which do hold in the short-run, but
not in the long-run. For example, the fact that employment 
uctuates and that
investment is aected by wage-prot relationships, makes it impossible that there
is a unique relationship between capital growth and output growth. Neverthe-
less, this is what Kaldor's (1957) technical progress function suggests2 (Rothschild
1959).
Kaldor's (1966) growth propositions have also been subject to numerous criticisms.
In regards to the rst growth proposition Wolfe (1968) pointed out that since both
the manufacturing and the services sector have a strong correlation with output
growth it is not really evident that it is manufacturing which is the driver of growth,
because it could also be the services sector. There is also no clear evidence whether
there are increasing returns in manufacturing (Wolfe 1968).
2This also applies to the technical progress function of Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962)
1914.5 Application of the Romer model
The last model to be estimated is Romer's (1986) endogenous growth model. Sim-
ilar to the Kaldor (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962; Kaldor 1966) model,
the Romer (1986) model embodies technological progress into capital. But in
contrast to Kaldor (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962; Kaldor 1966), techno-
logical progress is not a result from investment, but from knowledge. The creation
of new knowledge allows the creation of superior capital stock. Unfortunately,
Romer (1986) did not provide any details of what he actually refers to as knowl-
edge. Therefore, to test how knowledge aects technological progress and capital
accumulation, one has to experiment with dierent proxies for knowledge. The
following section will try patents, research and development (R&D) expenditure
and R&D personnel. Because of data limitations, estimations using patents will
cover the period from 1992 to 2010, estimations using R&D expenditure will cover
the period from 1992-2009 and estimations using R&D personnel covers the period
1996-2010.
4.5.1 Literature Review
In order to assess endogenous growth theories, including Romer (1986), Jones
(1995) has investigated the in
uence of the number of scientists and engineers en-
192gaged in R&D on TFP growth. According to Romer (1986) one would expect that
the higher the number of scientists and engineers engaged in R&D, the higher the
knowledge accumulation. Accordingly, it is expected that with a higher number
of scientists and engineers engaged in R&D, technological progress as measured
by TFP growth is increasing. However, Jones (1995) could not conrm this ex-
pectation. For a number of sample countries including Germany, Jones (1995)
found that while the number of scientists and engineers engaged in R&D increased
strongly, TFP growth did not show a growth trend. Therefore, Jones (1995) re-
jected Romer's (1986) model because no relationship between knowledge and TFP
growth can be found.
4.5.2 Estimations
This section will experiment with three dierent statistics as proxies for knowledge.
For each regression, two estimations will be run. The rst one will use technological
progress as a dependent variable and the second one will use capital as a dependent
variable.
4.5.2.1 Technological progress and patents
The rst attempt uses the number of patent grants. The thinking behind using
patent grants as a proxy for knowledge is that new patents capture the amount
of knowledge being created as a result from R&D activities of enterprises. The
193in
uence of knowledge on technical progress will be estimated using the following
equation:
TFP =  +  P + u (4.25)
where  is expected to be positive, TFP is the percentage growth of TFP and P
denotes the percentage growth of patents granted. Since Romer (1986) embodied
technological progress into capital, the eects of patents on capital will also be
analysed:
K =  +  P + u (4.26)
where  is expected to be positive, K is the percentage change in capital stock.
Table 4.19 shows the results of the two estimations:
194Table 4.19: Estimation of Romer's (1986) growth model using patents,
Germany 1992-2010
1. Estimation: TFP as dependent variable
Exact AR(2) Newton-Raphson Iterative Method converged after 6 iterations
Constant () Coecient () R-Bar2 DW
0.95 0.67 [0.130] 0.06 1.85
(0.04) (0.04)
2. Estimation: Capital as dependent variable
Exact AR(2) Newton-Raphson Iterative Method converged after 11 iterationss
Constant () Coecient () R-Bar2 DW
0.99 -0.00 [0.854] 0.90 1.94
(0.00) (0.00)
Notes: Signicant at 5 per cent level. P-value in square brackets. Standard error in parenthesis.
Durbin-Watson d Statistic: Signicance points of dl and du at 5 per cent signicance level:
dl = 1:18 and du = 1:40 (Gujarati and Porter 2010).
It can be seen that neither estimation provided statistically robust results, because
both coecients were statistically not signicant. Using the AR(1) method or
including a time trend did also not yield usable regression output. Therefore,
another proxy is tried.
4.5.2.2 Technological progress and R&D expenditure
Another possible proxy for knowledge is total R&D expenditure. The size of
R&D expenditure indicates the amount of resources being invested in knowledge
195creation. The following equations will be estimated:
TFP =  +  R&Dexp + u (4.27)
K =  +  R&Dexp + u (4.28)
where  is expected to be positive in both estimations and R&Dexp stands for
the change rate of total R&D expenditure. Table 4.20 shows that the the usage of
R&D expenditure also did not provide statistically signicant results:
Table 4.20: Estimation of Romer's (1986) growth model using R&D
expenditure, Germany 1992-2010
1. Estimation: TFP as dependent variable
Exact AR(2) Newton-Raphson Iterative Method converged after 14 iterations
Constant () Coecient () R-Bar2 DW
0.79 0.22 [0.219] -0.03 1.92
(0.18) (0.17)
2. Estimation: Capital as dependent variable
Exact AR(2) Newton-Raphson Iterative Method converged after 41 iterations
Constant () Coecient () R-Bar2 DW
0.97 0.16 [0.063] 0.92 1.84
(0.01) (0.01)
Notes: Signicant at 5 per cent level. P-value in square brackets. Standard error in parenthesis.
Durbin-Watson d Statistic: Signicance points of dl and du at 5 per cent signicance level:
dl = 1:18 and du = 1:40 (Gujarati and Porter 2010).
196Accordingly, another proxy for knowledge has to be tried.
4.5.2.3 Technological progress and R&D sta
The last attempt employs the amount of people conducting R&D work as a proxy
for knowledge. This is very similar to the approach of Jones (1995). As people
working in R&D create knowledge it would be expected that there is a relationship
between the amount of R&D sta and TFP growth or the capital stock. Thus,
the following equations are estimated:
TFP =  +  R&D-empl + u (4.29)
K =  +  R&D-empl + u (4.30)
where  is expected to be positive in both cases and R&D-empl refers to the change
rate of total R&D sta. Because of data limitations these estimations will only
cover the period from 1996 to 2010. Unfortunately, the estimations were again
unusable as Table 4.21 demonstrates:
197Table 4.21: Estimation of Romer's (1986) growth model using R&D
employment, Germany 1996-2010
1. Estimation: TFP as dependent variable
Error TERM : AR(1) converged after 5 iterations
Constant () Coecient () R-Bar2 DW
1.01 0.01 [0.983] -0.15 1.99
(0.31) (0.31)
2. Estimation: Capital as dependent variable
Exact AR(2) Newton-Raphson Iterative Method converged after 8 iterations
Constant () Coecient () R-Bar2 DW
0.99 -0.00 [0.827] 0.77 1.78
(0.02) (0.02)
Notes: Signicant at 5 per cent level. P-value in square brackets. Standard error in parenthesis.
Durbin-Watson d Statistic: Signicance points of dl and du at 5 per cent signicance level:
dl = 1:08 and du = 1:36 (Gujarati and Porter 2010).
Both times the independent variable was insignicant. Therefore, using total R&D
personnel as a proxy for knowledge does not work either.
It can be concluded that the attempts to estimate the Romer (1986) model were
unsuccessful. None of the used proxies showed a relationship with TFP growth or
capital growth. This conrms earlier ndings by Jones (1995). It can be concluded
that knowledge accumulation does not in
uence technological progress or capital
198accumulation in Germany. Therefore the Romer (1986) model is rejected.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter applied the three growth models empirically. For the Solow (1956)
- Swan (1956) growth model this thesis found higher TFP estimates than previ-
ous studies like Young (1994); Burda and Hunt (2001) or European Commission
(2002). Using the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) model it was also shown that the
rate of Germany's technological progress from 1992 to 2011 was lower than the
one of West Germany from 1971 to 1990. Further, it was shown that Germany's
business cycles can be explained by the RBC Theory. It was also pointed out that
the results of the application of the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) growth framework
are highly sensitive to the choice of the capital stock's depreciation rate and to the
choice of the capital share.
The application of Kaldor's (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962; Kaldor 1966)
growth model yielded dierent results to Solow (1956) - Swan (1956). The esti-
mation how the technical progress function of Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) showed
that Germany experienced higher technical progress during the period from 1992
to 2011 than West Germany had experienced during the period from 1971 to 1990.
However, by determining the labour elasticity it was found that the economy's pro-
199duction process during the second period was slightly less capital intensive than
it had been during the rst period. Thus, West Germany's stance of technology
from 1971 to 1990 was likely to be higher the one of Germany from 1992 to 2011.
In testing Kaldor's (1966) growth propositions it was conrmed that the manu-
facturing sector was the driver of Germany's economic growth from 1992 to 2011.
But Kaldor's (1966) second and third growth proposition could not been conrmed.
Romer's (1966) growth model could not be estimated. Neither patent grants, nor
R&D expenditure of R&D personnel demonstrated a relationship with TFP growth
or capital growth. Therefore the Romer (1986) model was rejected in explaining
the growth experience of Germany.
200Chapter 5: Findings and Conclusion
The aim of this thesis was to analyse Germany's economic growth based on the
Solow (1956) - Swan (1956), the Kaldor (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962;
Kaldor 1966) and the Romer (1986) model. Looking at the political and economic
development of post-war Germany, it was outlined that during the years of division
West Germany was a capitalist and wealthy country whereas East Germany was
socialist and relatively poor. Both countries reunited in 1990 and adopted West
Germany's constitution and economic system. As the unication implied severe
economic changes it was decided to break the empirical analysis into two time
periods. The rst time period is from 1971 to 1990 and includes West Germany
only. The second one is from 1992 to 2011 and looks at the reunited Germany.
The year of 1991 was excluded from the analysis for various reasons, including
problems concerning the estimation of the capital stock and because the strong
changes in labour stock could bias the estimation.
The economic performance of West Germany from 1971 to 1990 was found to be
201strong. The economy grew by 2.61 per cent on average, even though West Ger-
many was suering from two recessions resulting from the oil crises during this
time period. The application of the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) model found
that roughly four fths of the economic growth could be traced to technological
progress. Labour accumulation only played a minor role, as it contributed 0.34
per cent growth to the 2.61 per cent growth. Capital accumulation was even less
important and contributed 0.10 per cent. Therefore, technological progress was
the main driver behind West Germany's economic growth and it was argued that
this made West Germany's growth very sustainable because unlike factor accumu-
lation technological progress is not subject to marginal diminishing productivity.
In contrast, the overall economic performance of Germany after the reunication
was weak. The economy grew by only 1.33 per cent on average, which is signi-
cantly lower than the growth of West Germany from 1971 to 1990. Applying the
Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) it was shown that technological progress contributed
1.48 per cent to technological growth, capital accumulation contributed -0.26 per
cent and labour accumulation 0.11 per cent. Therefore, factor accumulation was
negative. While technological progress increased its relative importance for overall
economic growth after the reunication, the rate of technological progress during
the time period from 1992 to 2011 was signicantly lower than during the time
202period from 1971 to 1990. Therefore, less technological progress is one of the
reasons why Germany experienced low economic growth. Consequently, it was ar-
gued that in order to achieve higher economic growth rates, German policy makers
have to promote innovation in order to increase technological progress. In addi-
tion, investments could be promoted in order to raise growth coming from capital
accumulation.
It was also shown that for both time periods 
uctuations in the business cycle
can be explained by technological 
uctuations. This provides evidence to the Real
Business Cycle Theory.
The results of the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) model were found to be very sen-
sitive to the choice of the depreciation rate and the capital share. However, it is
a dicult task to nd a perfect depreciation rate or a perfect capital share and
the choice of these values will always dependent on a few assumptions. Therefore,
with the results of the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) application being so depen-
dent on the ambiguous choice of the depreciation rate and the capital share it was
argued that the numbers derived in this thesis can only serve as a point of reference.
The application of the Kaldor (Kaldor 1957; Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962; Kaldor
2031966) model yielded dierent results to the one of Solow (1956) - Swan (1956). Es-
timating the technical progress function of Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) it was found
that technological progress during the second time period was signicantly stronger
than during the rst one. The reason behind this is that Kaldor's (Kaldor 1957;
Kaldor and Mirrlees 1962; Kaldor 1966) model embodies technological progress
into capital replacement. In particular, it was found that from 1971 to 1990 cap-
ital replacement contributed 0.44 of every one per cent increased in real GDP.
From 1992 to 2011 capital replacement contributed 0.68 of every one per cent
increased in real GDP, making capital replacement signicantly more important
than in the time period before. This suggests that the lower TFP growth rates
of the time period from 1992 to 2011 as compared to the ones of the time period
from 1971 to 1990 are a result of the signicantly lower rate of capital investments
during the later timer period. Based on estimations of the labour elasticity, it was
found that the production of West Germany from 1971 to 1990 was slightly more
capital intensive than Germany's production from 1992 to 2011. Therefore, while
technological progress during the time period from 1992 to 2011 was higher than
during the time period from 1971 to 1990, the stance of technology was likely to
be lower than during the previous time period, because the production was less
capital intensive. This is most likely the result of the integration of the backward
East German economy.
204Analysing the German growth experience from 1992 to 2011 in respect to Kaldor's
(1966) growth propositions, only his rst law was conrmed. It was shown that
output growth in the manufacturing sector is the engine of overall output growth.
The second and the third growth proposition were rejected because the economet-
ric analysis did not provide statistically robust results.
Attempts to estimate the Romer (1986) model were not successful. This thesis
tested the in
uence of knowledge accumulation on technological progress and on
capital accumulation. Experimenting with the number of patent grants, R&D
expenditure and employment in R&D as proxies for knowledge accumulation, no
relationship was found with technological progress or capital accumulation. There-
fore, the Romer (1986) growth model was rejected for Germany.
There are a few limitations associated with the approach pursued in this thesis.
For example, there is no reliable data for the gross capital stock of the years from
2009 to 2011 available. Therefore, the values of the net capital stock for 2009
to 2011 were estimated using the moving average of the net capital stock. The
quality of these estimates is unknown. In addition, all net capital stock estimates
were derived using a depreciation rate of three percent. This depreciation rate
205was suggested by the literature, but this choice is again ambiguous. As the esti-
mates of the net capital stock used in this thesis had a major impact on all the
empirical results, the derived conclusions depend heavily on the quality of these es-
timates. However, the quality of the estimates could not be assessed for this thesis.
Another limitation concerns the labour input. Like the capital input, the labour
input has a major in
uence on the results of the empirical estimations in this
thesis. However, because of limited time and resources this thesis used total em-
ployment as a proxy for labour input, but working hours is normally the preferred
choice for a proxy.
A limitation concerning the application of the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) growth
framework is that the selected factor shares, which were estimated by Bernanke
and G urkaynak (2002), were determined for West Germany for the period from
1980 to 1995. It is possible that factor shares changed after the reunication and
therefore the results of the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) estimation for the time
period from 1992 to 2011 could be based on a wrong factor share. If this is the
case, TFP growth estimations could be biased downwards or upwards.
Future research could address the short comings of this thesis by improving the
206data which was used for the net capital stock. Furthermore, future research could
also repeat the empirical estimations conducted in this thesis by using total work-
ing hours instead of total employment. Implementing these suggestions would lead
to more robust results.
207Appendix A: The curvature of a produc-
tion function
The curvature of a production functions can be strictly concave or strictly convex.
To determine the curvature of a production function one has to determine the
second derivative of the production function. If the second derivative is negative,
the production function is strictly concave and if the second derivative is positive,
the production function is strictly convex (Chiang 1984).
Table A.1 and Figure A.1 reproduce how Chiang (1984) illustrated the concept of
the curvature of a function:
208Table A.1: The curvature of a production function
If at The derivative signs are We can illustrate by
x = x1 f
0(x1) > 0 f
00(x1) < 0 point A
x = x2 f
0(x2) = 0 f
00(x2) < 0 point B
x = x3 f
0(x3) < 0 f
00(x3) < 0 point C
x = x4 g
0(x4) < 0 g
00(x4) > 0 point D
x = x5 g
0(x5) = 0 g
00(x5) > 0 point E
x = x6 g
0(x6) > 0 g
00(x6) > 0 point F
Source: Chiang (1984), p. 242
Figure A.1: The curvature of a production function
Source: Chiang (1984), p. 243
Figure A.1(a) illustrates a strictly concave function, because its second derivative
is always negative. In contrast, Figure A.1(b) demonstrates a strictly convex
function, because its second derivative is always positive.
209Appendix B: Data
210T
a
b
l
e
B
.
1
:
D
e
r
i
v
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
t
h
e
N
e
t
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
S
t
o
c
k
,
W
e
s
t
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
1
9
7
0
-
1
9
9
0
Y
e
a
r
G
r
o
s
s
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
S
t
o
c
k
,
2
0
0
0
p
r
i
c
e
s
,
i
n
m
i
o
.
e
(
^
K
t
)
I
n


a
t
i
o
n
R
a
t
e
(
i
t
)
I
n


a
t
i
o
n
I
n
d
e
x
2
0
0
0
(
^
P
t
)
G
r
o
s
s
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
S
t
o
c
k
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
p
r
i
c
e
s
i
n
m
i
o
.
e
(
K

t
)
I
n


a
t
i
o
n
I
n
d
e
x
2
0
0
5
(
P
t
)
G
r
o
s
s
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
S
t
o
c
k
2
0
0
5
p
r
i
c
e
s
i
n
m
i
o
.
e
(
~
K
t
)
N
e
t
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
S
t
o
c
k
c
h
a
n
g
e
r
a
t
e
_
K
t
N
e
t
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
S
t
o
c
k
K
t
1
9
7
0
3
,
7
9
8
,
4
5
0
0
.
0
3
4
5
0
0
.
3
7
1
0
5
1
,
4
0
9
,
4
0
0
0
.
3
4
3
9
6
4
,
0
9
7
,
5
7
3
1
0
0
.
0
0
0
0
1
9
7
1
3
,
9
9
9
,
1
3
0
0
.
0
5
2
4
1
0
.
3
9
0
4
9
1
,
5
6
1
,
6
3
0
0
.
3
6
1
9
9
4
,
3
1
4
,
0
5
6
0
.
0
2
2
8
3
1
0
2
.
2
8
3
2
1
9
7
2
4
,
2
0
6
,
9
8
5
0
.
0
5
4
8
5
0
.
4
1
1
9
1
1
,
7
3
2
,
9
0
3
0
.
3
8
1
8
4
4
,
5
3
8
,
2
7
9
0
.
0
2
1
9
8
1
0
4
.
5
3
0
9
1
9
7
3
4
,
4
1
5
,
1
2
0
0
.
0
7
0
3
2
0
.
4
4
0
8
8
1
,
9
4
6
,
5
2
3
0
.
4
0
8
6
9
4
,
7
6
2
,
8
0
5
0
.
0
1
9
4
7
1
0
6
.
5
6
6
5
1
9
7
4
4
,
6
0
7
,
3
5
0
0
.
0
6
9
8
6
0
.
4
7
1
6
8
2
,
1
7
3
,
1
8
6
0
.
4
3
7
2
5
4
,
9
7
0
,
1
7
3
0
.
0
1
3
5
4
1
0
8
.
0
0
9
3
1
9
7
5
4
,
7
7
8
,
8
6
5
0
.
0
5
9
1
0
0
.
4
9
9
5
6
2
,
3
8
7
,
3
0
9
0
.
4
6
3
0
9
5
,
1
5
5
,
1
9
4
0
.
0
0
7
2
3
1
0
8
.
7
8
9
8
1
9
7
6
4
,
9
4
5
,
8
2
5
0
.
0
4
2
4
7
0
.
5
2
0
7
7
2
,
5
7
5
,
6
3
7
0
.
4
8
2
7
5
5
,
3
3
5
,
3
0
2
0
.
0
0
4
9
4
1
0
9
.
3
2
6
9
1
9
7
7
5
,
1
1
7
,
2
5
5
0
.
0
3
7
3
4
0
.
5
4
0
2
2
2
,
7
6
4
,
4
2
5
0
.
5
0
0
7
8
5
,
5
2
0
,
2
3
2
0
.
0
0
4
6
6
1
0
9
.
8
3
6
6
1
9
7
8
5
,
2
9
3
,
7
5
5
0
.
0
2
7
1
9
0
.
5
5
4
9
0
2
,
9
3
7
,
5
2
2
0
.
5
1
4
4
0
5
,
7
1
0
,
6
3
1
0
.
0
0
4
4
9
1
1
0
.
3
2
9
8
1
9
7
9
5
,
4
7
8
,
4
1
0
0
.
0
4
0
4
4
0
.
5
7
7
3
4
3
,
1
6
2
,
9
1
3
0
.
5
3
5
2
0
5
,
9
0
9
,
8
2
7
0
.
0
0
4
8
8
1
1
0
.
8
6
8
4
1
9
8
0
5
,
6
6
9
,
3
4
0
0
.
0
5
4
4
1
0
.
6
0
8
7
5
3
,
4
5
1
,
2
3
9
0
.
5
6
4
3
2
6
,
1
1
5
,
7
9
3
0
.
0
0
4
8
5
1
1
1
.
4
0
6
3
1
9
8
1
5
,
8
5
1
,
9
2
0
0
.
0
6
3
4
4
0
.
6
4
7
3
8
3
,
7
8
8
,
3
9
2
0
.
6
0
0
1
2
6
,
3
1
2
,
7
5
1
0
.
0
0
2
2
0
1
1
1
.
6
5
1
9
1
9
8
2
6
,
0
1
6
,
9
3
0
0
.
0
5
2
4
1
0
.
6
8
1
3
1
4
,
0
9
9
,
3
6
5
0
.
6
3
1
5
7
6
,
4
9
0
,
7
5
5
-
0
.
0
0
1
8
0
1
1
1
.
4
5
0
7
1
9
8
3
6
,
1
7
4
,
6
1
5
0
.
0
3
2
9
3
0
.
7
0
3
7
4
4
,
3
4
5
,
3
4
4
0
.
6
5
2
3
7
6
,
6
6
0
,
8
5
8
-
0
.
0
0
3
7
9
1
1
1
.
0
2
7
9
1
9
8
4
6
,
3
3
0
,
2
9
5
0
.
0
2
4
0
6
0
.
7
2
0
6
7
4
,
5
6
2
,
0
7
8
0
.
6
6
8
0
6
6
,
8
2
8
,
7
9
7
-
0
.
0
0
4
7
9
1
1
0
.
4
9
6
4
1
9
8
5
6
,
4
8
1
,
0
4
5
0
.
0
2
0
6
6
0
.
7
3
5
5
6
4
,
7
6
7
,
2
2
8
0
.
6
8
1
8
7
6
,
9
9
1
,
4
1
9
-
0
.
0
0
6
1
9
1
0
9
.
8
1
2
9
1
9
8
6
6
,
6
3
2
,
3
8
0
-
0
.
0
0
1
2
9
0
.
7
3
4
6
1
4
,
8
7
2
,
2
3
1
0
.
6
8
0
9
9
7
,
1
5
4
,
6
7
1
-
0
.
0
0
6
6
5
1
0
9
.
0
8
2
7
1
9
8
7
6
,
7
8
6
,
8
6
0
0
.
0
0
2
5
0
0
.
7
3
6
4
5
4
,
9
9
8
,
1
7
4
0
.
6
8
2
6
9
7
,
3
2
1
,
3
1
6
-
0
.
0
0
6
7
1
1
0
8
.
3
5
1
0
1
9
8
8
6
,
9
4
6
,
7
7
0
0
.
0
1
2
7
4
0
.
7
4
5
8
3
5
,
1
8
1
,
1
2
3
0
.
6
9
1
3
9
7
,
4
9
3
,
8
1
9
-
0
.
0
0
6
4
4
1
0
7
.
6
5
3
4
1
9
8
9
7
,
1
1
8
,
4
2
0
0
.
0
2
7
8
1
0
.
7
6
6
5
7
5
,
4
5
6
,
7
6
9
0
.
7
1
0
6
1
7
,
6
7
8
,
9
8
6
-
0
.
0
0
5
2
9
1
0
7
.
0
8
3
8
1
9
9
0
7
,
3
0
7
,
0
9
0
0
.
0
2
6
9
6
0
.
7
8
7
2
4
5
,
7
5
2
,
4
3
8
0
.
7
2
9
7
7
7
,
8
8
2
,
5
1
4
-
0
.
0
0
3
5
0
1
0
6
.
7
0
9
5
211T
a
b
l
e
B
.
2
:
D
e
r
i
v
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
t
h
e
N
e
t
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
S
t
o
c
k
,
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
1
9
9
1
-
2
0
0
8
Y
e
a
r
G
r
o
s
s
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
S
t
o
c
k
,
2
0
0
0
p
r
i
c
e
s
,
i
n
m
i
o
.
e
(
^
K
t
)
I
n


a
t
i
o
n
R
a
t
e
(
i
t
)
I
n


a
t
i
o
n
I
n
d
e
x
2
0
0
0
(
^
P
t
)
G
r
o
s
s
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
S
t
o
c
k
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
p
r
i
c
e
s
i
n
m
i
o
.
e
(
K

t
)
I
n


a
t
i
o
n
I
n
d
e
x
2
0
0
5
(
P
t
)
G
r
o
s
s
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
S
t
o
c
k
2
0
0
5
p
r
i
c
e
s
i
n
m
i
o
.
e
(
~
K
t
)
N
e
t
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
S
t
o
c
k
c
h
a
n
g
e
r
a
t
e
(
_
K
t
)
N
e
t
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
S
t
o
c
k
(
K
t
)
1
9
9
1
8
,
1
9
3
,
0
7
0
0
.
0
4
0
0
5
0
.
8
1
8
7
7
6
,
7
0
8
,
2
4
2
0
.
7
5
9
0
0
8
,
8
3
8
,
2
6
3
1
0
0
.
0
0
0
0
1
9
9
2
8
,
4
5
1
,
5
1
0
0
.
0
5
1
3
8
0
.
8
6
0
8
4
7
,
2
7
5
,
4
1
0
0
.
7
9
8
0
0
9
,
1
1
7
,
0
5
5
0
.
0
0
1
5
4
1
0
0
.
1
5
4
4
1
9
9
3
8
,
6
9
9
,
3
8
0
0
.
0
4
3
8
6
0
.
8
9
8
6
0
7
,
8
1
7
,
2
4
2
0
.
8
3
3
0
0
9
,
3
8
4
,
4
4
5
-
0
.
0
0
0
6
7
1
0
0
.
0
8
7
1
1
9
9
4
8
,
9
3
5
,
1
4
5
0
.
0
2
7
6
1
0
.
9
2
3
4
1
8
,
2
5
0
,
7
9
2
0
.
8
5
6
0
0
9
,
6
3
8
,
7
7
6
-
0
.
0
0
2
9
0
9
9
.
7
9
7
0
1
9
9
5
9
,
1
6
7
,
8
1
5
0
.
0
1
7
5
2
0
.
9
3
9
5
9
8
,
6
1
3
,
9
8
8
0
.
8
7
1
0
0
9
,
8
8
9
,
7
6
8
-
0
.
0
0
3
9
6
9
9
.
4
0
1
8
1
9
9
6
9
,
3
8
9
,
9
0
0
0
.
0
1
3
7
8
0
.
9
5
2
5
4
8
,
9
4
4
,
2
0
9
0
.
8
8
3
0
0
1
0
,
1
2
9
,
3
4
2
-
0
.
0
0
5
7
8
9
8
.
8
2
7
7
1
9
9
7
9
,
6
0
6
,
5
7
5
0
.
0
1
9
2
5
0
.
9
7
0
8
7
9
,
3
2
6
,
7
7
2
0
.
9
0
0
0
0
1
0
,
3
6
3
,
0
8
0
-
0
.
0
0
6
9
2
9
8
.
1
4
3
3
1
9
9
8
9
,
8
2
3
,
3
8
5
0
.
0
1
0
0
0
0
.
9
8
0
5
8
9
,
6
3
2
,
6
4
0
0
.
9
0
9
0
0
1
0
,
5
9
6
,
9
6
3
-
0
.
0
0
7
4
3
9
7
.
4
1
4
0
1
9
9
9
1
0
,
0
4
5
,
7
7
5
0
.
0
0
5
5
0
0
.
9
8
5
9
8
9
,
9
0
4
,
8
9
6
0
.
9
1
4
0
0
1
0
,
8
3
6
,
8
6
6
-
0
.
0
0
7
3
6
9
6
.
6
9
6
9
2
0
0
0
1
0
,
2
7
4
,
6
0
0
0
.
0
1
4
2
2
1
.
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
,
2
7
4
,
6
0
0
0
.
9
2
7
0
0
1
1
,
0
8
3
,
7
1
1
-
0
.
0
0
7
2
2
9
5
.
9
9
8
6
2
0
0
1
1
0
,
4
9
4
,
1
2
0
0
.
0
1
9
4
2
1
.
0
1
9
4
2
1
0
,
6
9
7
,
8
8
9
0
.
9
4
5
0
0
1
1
,
3
2
0
,
5
1
8
-
0
.
0
0
8
6
3
9
5
.
1
6
9
7
2
0
0
2
1
0
,
6
7
9
,
7
5
0
0
.
0
1
4
8
1
1
.
0
3
4
5
2
1
1
,
0
4
8
,
4
1
5
0
.
9
5
9
0
0
1
1
,
5
2
0
,
7
6
6
-
0
.
0
1
2
3
1
9
3
.
9
9
8
1
2
0
0
3
1
0
,
8
4
6
,
0
9
0
0
.
0
1
0
4
3
1
.
0
4
5
3
1
1
1
,
3
3
7
,
4
9
9
0
.
9
6
9
0
0
1
1
,
7
0
0
,
2
0
5
-
0
.
0
1
4
4
2
9
2
.
6
4
2
2
2
0
0
4
1
1
,
0
0
9
,
5
6
0
0
.
0
1
6
5
1
1
.
0
6
2
5
7
1
1
,
6
9
8
,
4
0
0
0
.
9
8
5
0
0
1
1
,
8
7
6
,
5
4
8
-
0
.
0
1
4
9
3
9
1
.
2
5
9
2
2
0
0
5
1
1
,
1
6
7
,
6
0
5
0
.
0
1
5
2
3
1
.
0
7
8
7
5
1
2
,
0
4
7
,
0
3
9
1
.
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
,
0
4
7
,
0
3
9
-
0
.
0
1
5
6
4
8
9
.
8
3
1
5
2
0
0
6
1
1
,
3
4
3
,
4
2
0
0
.
0
1
6
0
0
1
.
0
9
6
0
1
1
2
,
4
3
2
,
4
8
6
1
.
0
1
6
0
0
1
2
,
2
3
6
,
6
9
9
-
0
.
0
1
4
2
6
8
8
.
5
5
0
8
2
0
0
7
1
1
,
5
5
2
,
7
7
0
0
.
0
2
6
3
8
1
.
1
2
4
9
2
1
2
,
9
9
5
,
9
3
2
1
.
0
4
2
8
0
1
2
,
4
6
2
,
5
3
5
-
0
.
0
1
1
5
4
8
7
.
5
2
8
5
2
0
0
8
1
1
,
7
8
4
,
8
4
0
0
.
0
2
5
9
9
1
.
1
5
4
1
5
1
3
,
6
0
1
,
4
9
5
1
.
0
6
9
9
0
1
2
,
7
1
2
,
8
8
0
-
0
.
0
0
9
9
1
8
6
.
6
6
0
9
212Table B.3: First estimation of the Net Capital Stock, Germany 2009-
2011
Year Gross xed capital
formation in mio.
e(It)
Gross capital stock
in mio. e( ~ Kt)
Change in Net
Capital Stock ( _ K)
Net Capital Stock
(Kt)
2008 12,712,880 86.66090
2009 390255.2 13,103,136 0.000697622 86.72136
2010 413322.2 13,516,458 0.001543763 86.85523
2011 438811.2 13,955,269 0.002464956 87.06933
Table B.4: Second estimation of the Net Capital Stock, Germany 2009-
2011
Year Gross
Capital
Stock
current
prices in
mio. e(K
t )
Change
Rate Gross
Capital
Stock ( _ K
t )
In
ation
Index 2005
(Pt)
Gross
Capital
Stock 2005
prices in
mio. e( ~ Kt)
Net Capital
Stock
change rate
( _ Kt)
Net Capital
Stock (Kt)
2005 12,047,039 1.00000 12,047,039
2006 12,236,699 0.01574 1.01600 12,043,995
2007 12,462,535 0.01846 1.04280 11,951,030
2008 12,712,880 0.02009 1.06990 11,882,320 86.6609
2009 12,942,927 0.01810 1.07391 12,052,114 -0.01571 85.2994
2010 13,187,286 0.01888 1.08596 12,143,466 -0.02242 83.3870
2011 13,438,121 0.01902 1.11105 12,094,988 -0.03399 80.5525
213Table B.5: Third estimation of the Net Capital Stock, Germany 2009-
2011
Year Change in Net
Capital Stock ( _ K)
Net Capital Stock
(Kt)
2006 -1.4257%
2007 -1.1544%
2008 -0.9912% 86.6609
2009 -1.1904% 85.6293
2010 -1.1120% 84.6770
2011 -1.0979% 83.7474
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